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1179 
THE ATTACK ON NONPROFIT STATUS:  
A CHARITABLE ASSESSMENT 
James R. Hines Jr.*  
Jill R. Horwitz** 
Austin Nichols*** 
American nonprofit organizations receive favorable tax treatment, 
including tax exemptions and tax-deductibility of contributions, in 
return for their devotion to charitable purposes and restrictions not 
to distribute profits. Recent efforts to extend some or all of these tax 
benefits to for-profit companies making social investments, includ-
ing the creation of the new hybrid nonprofit/for-profit company 
form known as the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, threaten 
to undermine the vitality of the nonprofit sector and the integrity of 
the tax system.  
 
Reform advocates maintain that the ability to compensate execu-
tives based on performance and to distribute profits when attractive 
investment opportunities are scarce makes for-profit entities more 
efficient than nonprofit counterparts. Offering more favorable tax 
treatment to for-profits engaging in charity would encourage 
greater charitable entrepreneurship, the argument goes, and pro-
vide worthwhile competition for the nonprofit sector. As matters 
stand, however, nonprofits can and occasionally do reward execu-
tives with performance-based compensation, and their 
nondistribution rules impose no obligation to make subpar invest-
ments. The existing nonprofit sector is extremely competitive, and 
the charitable activities of for-profits already receive favorable tax 
treatment. Going further and offering socially active for-profits the 
tax benefits equivalent to those available currently to nonprofits 
would create opportunities for tax arbitrage by providing tax de-
ductions to high-bracket donors and taxable income for lightly 
taxed recipients. The difficulty of policing lines between nonprofit 
                                                                                                                      
 * Richard A. Musgrave Collegiate Professor of Economics and L. Hart Wright Collegiate 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
 ** Louis and Myrtle Moskowitz Research Professor of Business and Law, University of 
Michigan Law School, and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 *** Senior Research Associate, The Urban Institute. We thank Evelyn Brody, Lia Ernst, 
Marion Fremont-Smith, Brian Galle, Don Herzog, Doug Kahn, Kyle Logue, Richard Steinberg, and 
Eugene Steuerle for helpful comments. Funding for Jill Horwitz was generously provided by the 
Cook Fund at the University of Michigan Law School, and much of her work on the Article was 
completed while she was in residence at the University of Victoria Department of Economics. 
1
Hines et al.:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010
HINES FINAL B.DOC 4/5/2010 1:29 PM 
1180 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108:1179 
 
and for-profit activities of the same business entities would entail 
significant administrative complexity and is unlikely ultimately to 
succeed. And even should it succeed, the costs of offering new tax 
benefits to for-profit charities include not only foregone tax reve-
nues, but also spillover effects on the charitable activities of 
nonprofits. 
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Introduction 
Nonprofits are under attack. Tax authorities have increasingly chal-
lenged the income tax exemptions and the (often more valuable) property 
tax exemptions available to many nonprofits.1 Some policymakers and scho-
lars would weaken nonprofits further, diluting their tax privileges by 
offering them to for-profit organizations engaging in charitable activities. In 
this Article, we argue that nonprofit tax treatment should be reserved for 
nonprofit organizations.  
Many observers believe that, despite the good work of nonprofits, they 
benefit unfairly from an incongruity in the system used to identify eligibility 
for tax exemptions. Nonprofits qualify for favorable tax treatment by satis-
fying various criteria, most notably that they do not have shareholders to 
whom they can distribute profits. This requirement means that for-profits are 
ineligible for nonprofit tax exemptions. Yet this distinction between non-
                                                                                                                      
 1. Nonprofits vary in form and eligibility for various types of tax exemptions. Here we use 
the term “nonprofit” to mean the class of organizations commonly known among lawyers as “public 
charities.”  
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profit and for-profit organizational form seems over-strong to some advo-
cates.2 The requirements for nonprofit federal tax exemption—nonprofits 
must be both organized and operated for specified charitable purposes3—are 
surprisingly spare. Further, American charities law “is a relatively weak 
force in the realm of charity operations,” offering little guidance to nonprof-
its regarding how to provide charity.4 Moreover, nonprofit organizations are 
far from perfect, at times deploying their resources in ways that fail to ad-
vance the public good, and for-profit firms are occasionally willing to 
operate in ways that advance social welfare at the expense of their own prof-
its.  
It is tempting, therefore, to contemplate a radical policy reform in which 
charitable operations alone define which organizations might receive the 
benefits of favorable policy treatment. With such a reform, the provision of 
charitable services, regardless of organizational status, would be the sole 
criterion for tax and other benefits. The reform, therefore, would permit for-
profit firms to receive tax deductions to the extent that they use funds for 
specified charitable purposes, and deny tax deductions to nonprofit organi-
zations to the extent that they do not.5 
These same issues are often cast as a different set of policy questions—
whether nonprofit organizations merit their special tax status and, if they do, 
whether specific charitable acts should be required of organizations that en-
joy tax benefits.6 Once tax benefits are contingent on particular acts, it is a 
short step to contemplate permitting entities that do not qualify as nonprofit 
organizations nonetheless to enjoy the benefits available to nonprofits, at 
least insofar as they engage in charitable activities.  
There is considerable appeal to these proposals. Rather than toss a tax 
exemption into an undifferentiated sea of nonprofits and hope for the best, 
the government can act like a megaconsumer, using its vast purchasing 
                                                                                                                      
 2. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Sen. Grassley works to build 
confidence in nonprofits with greater transparency (May 29, 2007), available at http:// 
grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=1258. 
 3. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 4. Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in The Nonprofit 
Sector 243, 243 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
 5. Although I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) requires that charities be “organized and operated exclu-
sively for” listed purposes, the regulations are less stringent. The regulations clarify that “[a]n 
organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if it 
engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in 
section 501(c)(3).” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1) (2008) (second emphasis added).  
 6. Compare M. Gregg Bloche, PERSPECTIVE: Tax Preferences For Nonprofits: From Per 
Se Exemption To Pay-For-Performance, 25 Health Aff. w304 (2006) (arguing that tax benefits for 
hospitals and health plans should be tied to certain accomplishment), David A. Hyman & William 
M. Sage, PERSPECTIVE: Subsidizing Health Care Providers Through The Tax Code: Status Or 
Conduct?, 25 Health Aff. w312 (2006) (advocating linking tax-exemption to conduct), and Rich-
ard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Nonprofit Organizations in the Health Sector, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 
129, 130 (1994) (noting that, in the health care sector, “the subsidy is generally tied to the nonprofit 
‘title’ rather than specific performance criteria”), with Jill Horwitz, PERSPECTIVE: Nonprofit Own-
ership, Private Property, And Public Accountability, 25 Health Aff. w308 (2006) (advocating 
linking tax-exemption to status). 
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power to buy the public goods that it wants.7 And, according to proponents,8 
if the government is wise enough to contract with for-profit organizations, it 
can harness private sector incentives and market competition—which, at 
least until recently, seemed to have desirable effects. 
State and federal government actors have found at least some of these 
ideas persuasive, perhaps in part because of recent political concerns about 
the insufficiency of charitable activity by nonprofit organizations. As a result 
of these concerns, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and state tax agen-
cies are once more tweaking exemption requirements for nonprofits to better 
monitor their provision of charity.9 The United States is hardly alone in this 
endeavor; the United Kingdom recently implemented major reforms to its 
charity laws, adding specificity to the public benefit requirement that likely 
predates the Statute of Elizabeth (1601).10 (One might think that after hun-
dreds of years of study and practice, Western governments would have 
answers to questions about the extent to which organizations should be fa-
vored based on their charitable status, but easy answers have been elusive.) 
Some state governments have taken reform one step further toward the 
creation of for-profit charities, embracing what is known as “social entre-
preneurship,” the blending of for-profit incentives with charitable ends.11 A 
prominent example is the creation of a new corporate form, the Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Company (“L3C”). As we explain below, this example 
highlights some of the risks associated with diluting the significance of non-
profit status and, properly interpreted, points to ways in which the nonprofit 
form may be more amenable to the use of incentives than is often assumed.  
Another recent development is scholarship endorsing new legal forms to 
ease the provision of for-profit charity. Of particular note is the publication 
of Professors Anup Malani and Eric Posner’s provocatively entitled article 
                                                                                                                      
 7. This is the standard economic approach to public-good provision. See, e.g., Paul A. Sa-
muelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 387 (1954).  
 8. For a survey of evidence and arguments in favor of contracting with for-profit providers, 
and balanced thoughts on when it is more and less warranted, see Jonas Prager, Contracting Out 
Government Services: Lessons from the Private Sector, 54 Pub. Admin. Rev. 176 (1994). 
 9. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) recently redesigned Form 990, the 
form used by nonprofit tax filers, to require more specificity in reporting charitable activities. Press 
Release, IRS, IRS Releases Final 2008 Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations, Adjusts Filing 
Threshold to Provide Transition Relief (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/ 
article/0,,id=176722,00.html. 
Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) recently announced that he would introduce legislation de-
fining specific, bright-line standards for tax exemption. John Reichard, Grassley: ‘Bright Line Test’ 
Needed for Hospital Tax Exemption, Cong. Q. Healthbeat, Oct. 15, 2008. 
 10. The preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, also known as the Statute of Elizabeth, 
enumerates permissible charitable purposes. 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601). The Act was first passed in 1597, 
39 Eliz., c. 6, but the later act, which includes “unimportant amendments,” is typically cited. See, 
e.g., W.K. Jordan, Philanthropy in England, 1480–1660, at 112 (1959). For discussion of the 
statutes and the enumerated permissible purposes, see Jill Horwitz, Nonprofits and Narrative: Piers 
Plowman, Anthony Trollope, and Charities Law, Mich. St. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).  
 11. For discussion of related developments, see Andrew Wolk, Aspen Institute, Ad-
vancing Social Entrepreneurship: Recommendations for Policy Makers and Government 
Agencies (2008). 
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“The Case for For-Profit Charities.”12 The article promises a break from the 
familiar debate about the merits of conditioning charitable tax exemption on 
charitable status or contracts for charitable behavior. Instead, following a 
path taken by other analysts who assume that for-profit organizations are 
more efficient than nonprofits,13 Malani and Posner argue that “there is no 
reason to condition the tax subsidy for charitable activities on organizational 
form.”14 They offer a litany of benefits of for-profit ownership and, by impli-
cation, the costs of nonprofit ownership. Although appealing on first 
reading, careful examination of the arguments raises questions about their 
economic foundations, and helps illuminate why the article’s policy recom-
mendation—making subsidies available to organizations of any type that 
provide desirable and measurable public benefits—is considerably less 
sound than the current regime of restricting tax benefits to organizations 
with nonprofit status. 
Why deny for-profits the opportunity to compete with nonprofits on 
equal terms? What if both pursue (at least in part) the same goals? One rea-
son is that, as a realistic matter, it is almost impossible to administer a 
system that ties tax benefits to public benefit provision levels. Leaving aside 
whether a practical system could be designed, however, such a system 
would create significant tax avoidance opportunities for self-interested tax-
payers. Symmetric treatment of nonprofits and for-profits requires 
permitting tax deductible contributions to for-profit entities undertaking 
charitable activity. This, in turn, permits taxpayers to claim deductions for 
indirect gifts to owners of companies with charitable impulses, thereby un-
dercutting the current nondeductibility of gifts and creating tax arbitrage 
opportunities whenever donors are in higher tax brackets than donees. Con-
sequently, symmetric treatment of nonprofits and for-profits would be 
accompanied by significant tax planning opportunities and tax base erosion. 
Even so, might the costs of tax avoidance be worth the benefits of condi-
tioning charitable exemption on behavior, regardless of ownership? Since 
the potential benefits are so modest, we think that they would not. First, the 
relevant compensation structures and other methods that for-profit firms use 
to create productivity incentives are already available to nonprofit organiza-
tions. However, on the whole they appear less valuable for social enterprise, 
as evidenced by how infrequently they are used. Perhaps more important, 
given the competitive nonprofit environment, it is unlikely that nonprofit 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017 
(2007); see also, e.g., Hadley Rose, Comment, The Social Business: The Viability of a New Business 
Entity Type, 44 Willamette L. Rev. 131 (2007). 
 13. See, e.g., Dennis R. Young, Alternative Perspectives on Social Enterprise, in Nonprofits 
& Business 21, 44 (Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2009); Thomas J. Billitteri, 
Aspen Institute, Mixing Mission and Business: Does Social Enterprise Need A New Legal 
Approach? 3 (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/ 
pubs/New_Legal_Forms_Report_FINAL.pdf; Bloche, supra note 6, at w304–07; Hyman & Sage, 
supra note 6, at w312 (asking whether it makes “any sense to subsidize some health care providers 
by exempting them from federal, state, and local taxes, based solely on institutional status”).  
 14. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2023. 
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organizations would provide more efficient or better provision of charity if 
exposed to bracing competition from expanded social entrepreneurship by 
for-profit firms. Using realistic assumptions about nonprofit markets, we 
identify advantages of the current system that links ownership status with 
tax benefits.  
Part I of the Article provides background on nonprofits and how they 
differ from for-profit firms. Part II considers the concept of for-profit chari-
ties, describing recent legal developments regarding nonprofit/for-profit 
hybrids and summarizing the case for for-profit charities. Part III identifies 
and challenges the commonly advanced, yet ungrounded, assumptions that 
(1) for-profits are more efficient than nonprofits, and (2) the law forbids 
nonprofits from using compensation practices that increase efficiency. It 
further suggests that critics of the nonprofit form often analyze nonprofits in 
isolation, rather than as organizations that operate in markets. A more realis-
tic representation—one that abandons the notion that for-profits operate in 
robustly competitive markets while nonprofits do not compete at all—helps 
clarify the distinction between ownership characteristics and industry char-
acteristics. In Part IV, we offer a detailed response to critiques of current 
justifications for linking charitable status and tax benefits, and in Part V we 
consider some of the unintended, and concerning, tax consequences of for-
profit charities. We conclude by considering the implications of these argu-
ments for a normative evaluation of for-profit charities.  
I. The Nonprofit Firm 
Laws from various doctrinal areas and levels of government regulate 
nonprofit organizations, including the common law of trusts and property, 
tax law, state business and nonprofit codes, as well as formal and informal 
powers held by state attorneys general.15 The absence of shareholders is the 
first among several features that distinguish nonprofits from for-profits; 
nonprofit organizations may have members and other stakeholders, but may 
not distribute profits to any owner. This means that their directors and man-
agers may dictate the use of nonprofit assets, but may not personally profit 
from those assets.16  
Beyond this, it is notoriously difficult to characterize nonprofits.17 Non-
profits include familiar organizations such as the Salvation Army or the Girl 
Scouts, as well as churches, synagogues, mosques, the National Football 
                                                                                                                      
 15. For a comprehensive review of these laws, see Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing 
Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation (2004). For a more brief 
review of the laws, see Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, 
and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1345 (2003).  
 16. Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in The Nonprofit Sector, supra 
note 4, at 1 (citing Avner Ben-Ner & Derek C. Jones, Employee Participation, Ownership, and 
Productivity: A Theoretical Framework, 34 Indus. Rel. 532 (1995)). 
 17. See Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and Lyndon Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking 
at Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corporations—The American Bar Association’s Revised Model Non-
profit Corporation Act, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 751, 755–56 (1989). 
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League, and, until recently, the New York Stock Exchange. Health service 
organizations, such as hospitals and nursing homes, account for 59 percent 
of total nonprofit spending, with educational organizations accounting for an 
additional 17 percent.18 In fact, the majority of nonprofit revenues comes 
from fees for services rather than donations or grants.19 In addition, state law 
generally requires nonprofits to identify a charitable mission in their orga-
nizing documents and operate in furtherance of that mission, restricts 
distribution of assets to other charities upon dissolution, and invests over-
sight authority in the state attorney general.20  
This Article is concerned most directly with whether for-profits should 
be afforded nonprofit tax privileges.21 At issue are two federal tax provisions 
available to eligible nonprofits, one that exempts from tax most net income 
that they earn, and one that permits donors to deduct their contributions.22 
Individual tax filers must itemize their deductions to benefit from charitable 
contributions, and little more than one-third of American taxpayers item-
ize.23 Contribution limits further restrict the tax benefit, and the tax benefit 
associated with taking a charitable deduction equals the product of the tax-
payer’s marginal tax rate and the amount contributed.24 Despite these 
limitations, the Office of Management and Budget estimates that American 
individuals and corporations together received roughly $46.6 billion of tax 
                                                                                                                      
 18. These percentages are based on spending reported to the Internal Revenue Service for tax 
year 2004 as reported by Paul Arnsberger, Charities, Social Welfare, and Other Tax-exempt Organi-
zations, 2004, Stat. Income Bull., Fall 2007, at 210, 213. Figures for other recent years show 
similar dominance of the nonprofit sector by health and educational organizations. See IRS.gov, SOI 
Tax Stats—Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Organizations Statistics, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/ 
charitablestats/article/0,,id=97176,00.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).  
 19. Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle, Scope and Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, 
in The Nonprofit Sector, supra note 4, at 66, 77. 
 20. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code §§ 5110–6910 (West 1990); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 180, § 4 
(2008); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.251 (West 2008) (requiring attorney general approval for 
dissolution of Michigan nonprofits); id. § 450.2855 (requiring that nonprofit articles include a plan 
for distribution of assets to satisfy debts and then to other charity or government organizations, with 
similar purpose). 
 21. States generally follow federal law, exempting organizations, mainly charities, from state 
income, sales, and property taxes. These state tax benefits are likely more valuable than the federal 
benefits that attract so much academic and political attention. 
 22. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); I.R.C. § 170(a). 
 23. Sean Marcia & Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2005, Stat. Income 
Bull., Fall 2007, at 5, 8 (reporting that 36.9 percent of U.S. individual income tax filers itemized 
their deductions in tax year 2005). 
 24. Individual taxpayers are not entitled to take tax deductions exceeding 50 percent of their 
adjusted gross incomes, and certain categories of property are subject to more stringent limits de-
scribed in I.R.C. § 170(b). The tax benefit provided in I.R.C. § 170 consists of reducing taxable 
income by the permitted amount of the contribution, which in turn reduces tax obligations by the 
product of the reduction and the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. Thus, for example, a taxpayer with 
$100,000 of income and without any deductible contributions might owe $18,000 in federal income 
taxes. The same taxpayer with $2,000 of deductible contributions and facing a 25 percent marginal 
tax rate (though a lower average tax rate, reflecting the progressivity of the federal income tax rate 
schedule) would pay only $17,500 in federal taxes.  
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savings from charitable contributions in 2007.25 Of this amount, the tax 
benefit for donations to educational institutions accounts for $4.3 billion, 
donations to health organizations account for another $4.3 billion, and the 
rest, primarily religious organizations, account for $38.2 billion. Donations 
to for-profit corporations are not eligible for this favorable treatment.  
Even with these exemptions and deductions, no nonprofit is completely 
exempt from taxation, since all are subject to the federal unrelated business 
income tax,26 and many make payments in lieu of taxes or other fees for ser-
vices provided by local governments. Many categories of nonprofits are 
eligible for federal income tax exemptions, while fewer are eligible to re-
ceive tax-deductible donations. With the exception of churches and very 
small nonprofits, organizations to which contributions are tax deductible 
must be certified by the IRS and most—though not all—are described by 
I.R.C. 501(c) (3) (addressing organizations commonly thought of as chari-
ties), 501(c)(13) (addressing cemetery companies), and 501(c)(19) 
(addressing veterans’ organizations). Most organizations described by other 
I.R.C. 501(c) sections are tax exempt but do not, with some exceptions, re-
ceive tax-deductible contributions. For example, individual contributions to 
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations or 501(c)(6) organizations such as 
chambers of commerce are not tax-deductible, but business contributions 
may qualify for expense deductions. 
II. For-Profit Charities: Recent Examples and  
the Case for Expansion 
An organization need not have nonprofit status in order to undertake 
charitable activity. A for-profit company may donate to a charity and, con-
sequently, receive a tax break for doing so. In fact, although corporate 
giving decreased considerably in 2008, it still amounted to $14.5 billion, or 
5 percent of all charitable giving.27 Many for-profits participate in cause-
related marketing, some of whom build their missions around the pursuit of 
social causes. The Working Assets phone company, which recently changed 
its name to CREDO, distinguishes itself as “the only phone company calling 
                                                                                                                      
 25. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment: Analytical Perspectives 288–91 (2008). 
 26. So-called unrelated business income is subject to taxation at normal corporate rates, 
though in practice the unrelated business income tax collects extremely little income each year. See, 
e.g., Margaret Riley, Unrelated Business Income Tax Returns, 2004, Stat. Income Bull., Winter 
2008, at 76, 76–104 (reporting that all nonprofit organizations together paid only $368 million of 
unrelated business income tax in 2004). For evidence of paltry unrelated business income tax pay-
ments in other years (and the determinants of taxable incomes of nonprofit organizations), see James 
R. Hines Jr., Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, in 13 Tax Policy 
and the Economy 57 (James M. Poterba ed., 1999). 
 27. Press Release, Giving USA Found., U.S. charitable giving estimated to be $307.65 bil-
lion in 2008 (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/News/2009/docs/ 
GivingReaches300billion_06102009.pdf. 
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for a special prosecutor to investigate crimes of torture committed during 
the Bush administration.”28 
For-profit companies can release their employees to provide free labor 
for charitable causes. Community service is a part of the corporate mission 
of Timberland, an outdoor-gear company. It regularly releases its employees 
to rebuild playgrounds and engage in other community-development pro-
jects.29 For some, these unremunerated for-profit efforts do not go far 
enough. In this Part, we outline recent developments in for-profit philan-
thropy and the extension of the trend into new legal forms. We then outline a 
case for extending nonprofit tax benefits to for-profits that provide charity.  
A. Existing For-Profit Charities and New Hybrid Form 
Although there is only one prominent example of a for-profit charity, 
Google.org, there is a densely filled continuum of ownership types ranging 
from what one would think of as pure charities to wantonly profit-
maximizing corporations. Google.org is distinct in that although its mis-
sion—addressing climate change, poverty, and emerging disease30—is 
typical of a charity, it retains rights unavailable to nonprofits, such as the 
rights to distribute to its shareholders any profits earned along the way and 
engage in unlimited lobbying of public officials.31 It is like a nonprofit in 
that it makes grants to nonprofit organizations that advance its mission, but, 
unlike a nonprofit, it also makes equity investments in for-profit companies 
as part of its main mission (an activity that, if it were a nonprofit, might run 
afoul of the nonprofit commerciality doctrine). In addition, unlike traditional 
nonprofits, returns on Google.org’s investments may benefit Google Inc.,32 a 
for-profit entity. In fact, in its request for proposals for its RechargeIT pro-
gram, Google.org restricted its investments to for-profits.33  
Charity-minded for-profits need not adopt a purely charitable mission, 
like Google.org. They may instead pursue charitable ends, and signal those 
ends to consumers, by voluntarily adopting some of the restrictions more 
commonly imposed on nonprofits. For example, the 501(c)(3) charity B-lab 
certifies that its member (“B”) corporations, all of which are for-profit  
                                                                                                                      
 28. Working Assets, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.workingassets.com/FAQs.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 29. See Timberland, Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy, http://timberland.com/corp/ 
index.jsp?page=csr_strategy (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 30. Google.org, http://www.google.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 31. For a discussion of Google.org’s legal privileges, such as unlimited lobbying, see Dana 
Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2437 (2009). 
 32. Id. at 2454–59.  
 33. RechargeIT.org, RechargeIT Request for Investment Proposals, http://www.google.org/ 
recharge/rfp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (“This RFP is focused exclusively on investments in for-
profit companies. This RFP builds on a series of earlier grants for non-profits and policy work an-
nounced by Google.org as part of the RechargeIT initiative in June 2007. We may fund additional 
proposals in support of policy, R&D and other related work by non-profits, but that is not the focus 
of the current RFP.”).  
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entities, adhere to its social and environmental standards.34 Although the 
certification is done through a private, rather than a government, entity, the 
members must amend their governing documents to incorporate the interests 
of employees, community, and the environment as well as shareholders. B 
Corporations include Dansko (a shoe manufacturer), Impact Makers (a non-
stock management consulting firm), Seventh Generation (a household prod-
ucts manufacturer), and Mugshots (a self-described “socially conscious” 
café serving fair-trade drinks and local foods in Philadelphia).35  
In addition, the law currently allows for “social enterprise,” the harness-
ing of profit-making organizations in the service of fully charitable ends. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 permits private foundations to merge their in-
vesting and program functions to make Program Related Investments 
(“PRIs”).36 A PRI is a combination of a grant and an investment—e.g., a 
below-market loan for micro-development purposes—that counts towards 
the minimum annual required foundation payout and allows the foundation 
to receive a return on the investment.37  
Another example of the concept of for-profit charities can be found in 
recent calls for authorizing new hybrid companies that might “accept foun-
dation grants and tax-deductible contributions that would be segregated on 
the books and used only for charitable purposes.”38 In fact, private founda-
tions may already invest in commercial for-profits provided they follow 
stringent “expenditure responsibility” rules to ensure that the funds are not 
used for for-profit purposes.39 For example, the IRS has permitted the Gates 
Foundation to invest in for-profit pharmaceutical companies to help reach its 
goal of reducing disease in developing countries.40 As such, it is an example 
of private philanthropy harnessing the private, for-profit sector for public 
ends while maintaining its promise to reinvest any profits in charitable pro-
duction. Due both to prevailing regulations and to the creativeness of 
enterprise, this mixture of nonprofit and for-profit action does not require 
the existence of organizations that themselves embody both nonprofit and 
for-profit forms.  
                                                                                                                      
 34. B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 35. Id. 
 36. For a detailed overview of PRIs, see James P. Joseph & Andras Kosaras, New Strategies 
for Leveraging Foundation Assets, 20 Tax’n of Exempts 22 (2008). For the necessity of new legal 
structures to allow social entrepreneurship, see Billitteri, supra note 13, passim. 
 37. I.R.C. § 942 requires private nonoperating foundations to disburse at least 5 percent of 
their assets annually or face a draconian penalty tax. I.R.C. § 942 (2006). I.R.C. § 945 cites PRIs as 
an exception to the rule prohibiting foundations from making risky investments that jeopardize a 
foundation’s charitable purpose. I.R.C. § 945 (2006). 
 38. Billitterri, supra note 13, at 7. 
 39. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)–(e) (2008).  
 40. In a Private Letter Ruling, the IRS permitted the foundation to make program-related 
investments in private, for-profit industry to accelerate the discovery, development, and adoption of 
health interventions to reduce disease in developing countries. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200603031 (Jan. 
20, 2006). 
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Some states, however, have gone further in permitting for-profit charita-
ble activity. Vermont recently made a variant of such investing easier by 
authorizing a new corporate form, the L3C. The L3C is the first formal non-
profit/for-profit hybrid. The authorizing statute requires that it: (1) must 
significantly further charitable or educational purposes as defined by the 
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B), (2) would not have been formed but for that purpose, 
and (3) must not have as a significant purpose to produce income or appre-
ciation of property, although evidence of producing significant income or 
capital appreciation is not conclusive evidence of such a purpose.41 Since the 
L3C is taxed like any other limited liability company, the entity does not pay 
federal income tax; instead, its net income is allocated among the members 
who, unless themselves exempt organizations, presumably are taxed on this 
income. It is unclear whether such an entity would pay local property tax if 
it owned property.42  
Creation of the L3C structure is a step in the direction of facilitating the 
creation of for-profit charities. Although the statute was designed to encour-
age foundation investment, there is no reason why individuals or business 
entities such as corporations or limited liability companies could not invest 
in an L3C. One of the main proponents of the L3C form envisions just this, 
suggesting that foundations would hold the highest level of investor risk and 
demand the lowest return, allowing other investors to accept less risk but 
also to “accept some of its return in the form of enhanced social welfare.”43  
The investor in this case is not entitled to an explicit charitable tax de-
duction for the financial return she forgoes in exchange for enhanced social 
welfare, though it does not follow that the tax system fails to subsidize an 
investment directed at social welfare rather than market returns. Investors 
receive implicit deductions in the sense that their taxable incomes are re-
duced when the L3C invests in charitable or educational activities that 
generate below-market financial returns; as is well known, the tax system 
effectively subsidizes any investments that produce subpar returns, whether 
or not undertaken with social goals in mind.44 Stated another way, there is no 
tax on the pleasure that comes from making an investment that advances 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (Supp. 2008). 
 42. Title 32, chapter 125 of the Vermont Code concerning state and local tax exemptions 
does not address the treatment of L3Cs. Property must be dedicated unconditionally to public use, 
its primary use must benefit an indefinite class of the public, and it must be owned and operated on a 
nonprofit basis to benefit from tax exemption. Am. Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Manchester, 557 
A.2d 900 (Vt. 1989). According to Suzanne Montie of the Vermont Department of Taxes in the state 
Agency of Administration, it is unclear whether a L3C holding real estate would be granted property 
tax exemption. Letter from Suzanne Montie to Jill Horwitz, Professor of Law, University of Michi-
gan (August 2008). 
 43. Americans for Community Development, http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/ 
faqs.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (question no. 6). 
 44. The nature of the indirect tax subsidy for charitable activity is that the alternative—crass 
profit-making—is afforded much less favorable tax treatment, because income is subject to taxation 
under I.R.C. § 61. I.R.C. § 61 (2006). Whether the tax system can be said to “subsidize” charitable 
activity in such a case may depend on one’s point of view, though what is clear is that the system 
treats these alternatives differently. 
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charitable goals, whereas the commercial alternative generates a return that 
the government taxes. The tax benefits would be greater still if investors 
were permitted full deductions for their investments in social purposes, but 
investors nonetheless reap a substantial portion of the tax benefits available 
to nonprofits simply by virtue of not having to pay taxes on returns that they 
have not earned. 
B. For-Profit Charities 
Some scholars and advocates have recently argued that advances in for-
profit charity like those discussed above do not go far enough. They endorse 
the creation of new legal forms or new legal entitlements that encourage the 
blending of nonprofit purposes with for-profit form. In his Nobel Peace 
Prize lecture, for example, Professor Muhammed Yunus called for the crea-
tion of a new legal form to better account for charitable businesses:  
Once social business is recognized in law, many existing companies will 
come forward to create social businesses in addition to their foundation ac-
tivities. Many activists from the non-profit sector will also find this an 
attractive option. Unlike the non-profit sector where one needs to collect 
donations to keep activities going, a social business will be self-sustaining 
and create surplus for expansion since it is a non-loss enterprise. Social 
business will go into a new type of capital market of its own, to raise capi-
tal.45  
In a student note drawing on the example of the micro-lending project 
for which Yunus and the Grameen Bank won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, 
Hadley Rose worried that without changes in the law, worthy micro-lending 
operations abroad like Grameen would fall afoul of U.S. nonprofit tax laws 
“including the exempt purpose requirement, the commerciality doctrine, the 
private benefit doctrine, the prohibition against certain joint ventures, the 
Unrelated Business Income Tax (“UBIT”), and the Excess Benefit Tax 
(EBT).”46 She recommends a new legal form that would encourage nonprofit 
business and concludes that “[c]harity law in the US is in need of a para-
digm shift by which we encourage business-oriented solutions to poverty 
and social problems, and the creation of a new legal form of business could 
precipitate this paradigm shift.”47 Citing Yunus, Rose envisions that this new 
social business type will attract new types of entrepreneurs:  
[These entrepeneurs] will have not only a profit motivation, but also a mo-
tivation to promote social benefits in the world.  
These dual motivations will spawn a “social business enterprise,” which 
will essentially operate under the constructs of both a corporation and a 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize 2006: Nobel Lecture, 13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 
267, 272 (2007).  
 46. Rose, supra note 12, at 134. 
 47. Id. at 135.  
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nonprofit organization. The social business “may or may not earn profit, 
but like any other businesses they must not incur losses.”48  
Since it is not clear that the lack of a hybrid legal form has posed a problem 
for the Bank—Rose notes that the Bank has been a big success in terms of 
profits and fruitful partnerships with other for-profits49—she implies that it 
is wrong for shareholder businesses owned by poor people to be taxed.50 
In Uncharitable: How Restraints on Nonprofits Undermine Their Poten-
tial, Dan Pallotta, founder of the company that created the successful AIDS 
rides and Breast Cancer 3-day events, uses the Grameen Bank as an exam-
ple in arguing that nonprofits are unduly hampered because they are denied 
the business tools available to for-profits.51 He complains that unlike the 
Grameen Bank that operates in Bangladesh, the U.S.-based Grameen Foun-
dation, “cannot raise capital in the stock market to increase its ability to 
provide capital.”52 More generally, Pallotta explains that in every dimen-
sion—from executive pay to advertising to raising capital—nonprofits 
would be better off if they could act more like for-profits. Moreover, public 
policies and our culture of nonprofits not only makes nonprofits ineffective 
and inefficient, but immoral.53  
As noted above, Professors Malani and Posner have recently argued that 
federal, state, and local tax exemptions and donation deductibility should be 
afforded to for-profit firms that produce the types of goods produced by 
nonprofits. They observe that for-profit firms provide a large number of 
community-benefit goods and services, and argue that they should be re-
warded with tax benefits for doing so.54 They explain that even if such  
                                                                                                                      
 48. Id. at 150. 
 49. See id. at 149. 
 50. See id. at 150. 
 51. Dan Pallotta, Uncharitable: How Restraints on Nonprofits Undermine Their 
Potential 2008. 
 52. Id. at 13. 
 53. E.g., id. at 17. In fact, Pallotta implies that if nonprofits were permitted to more fully 
embrace capitalism, we could solve our social problems such as hunger on earth, cancer, AIDS, and 
other causes of human suffering. Id. at 3. 
 54. See, e.g., Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2022, 2062–64. The article also cites Mat-
thew J. Kotchen, Green Markets and Private Provision of Public Goods, 114 J. Pol. Econ. 816, 817 
(2006), for evidence of the prevalence of environmentally friendly goods produced by for-profit 
firms. But Kotchen shows that the introduction of green goods can reduce social welfare relative to a 
setting in which for-profit firms do not produce green goods and nonprofit environmental organiza-
tions receive contributions from private individuals who want to promote environmental protection. 
According to Kotchen, “[p]erhaps the most counterintuitive possibility is one in which the green 
market makes every individual worse off. Figure 3 illustrates an example [where] equilibrium provi-
sion decreases . . . and the reduced spill-ins generate negative income effects for both individuals. 
But in this case the positive income effects from the lower price of [the characteristic which is rival 
in consumption] are not large enough to be offsetting.” Id. at 829. Kotchen demonstrates that reduc-
tions in aggregate welfare due to the green market are dependent on various features that may in fact 
be common in green markets, such as lower initial consumption of the private characteristic. Thus 
the introduction of shade-grown coffee or green electricity can reduce not only direct donations to 
preserving rainforests or offsetting climate impacts, but also total preservation or offsetting, and 
actually make all of society worse off (in part because coffee and electricity, the private characteris-
tics bundled in those impure public goods, represent a small part of total consumption). Id. 
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for-profits have shareholders or compensate employees through profit-
sharing, their activities would serve the public interest.55 Like other observ-
ers,56 Malani and Posner assume that for-profit legal structures cause greater 
efficiency than nonprofit structures. More specifically, they theorize that  
for-profits are more efficient than nonprofits because of intrinsic differences 
in their compensation schemes. Owners and executives of for-profit firms 
generally receive performance-based compensation, which both motivates 
high levels of attention and effort and attracts managers who are confident 
in their capabilities. These benefits of performance-tailored compensation 
are presumably lost if managers are paid like bureaucrats, which is generally 
not true of the corporate sector of U.S. businesses,57 but may be characteris-
tic of nonprofits. The heart of their article, which we describe in great detail 
below, does not build an affirmative case for for-profit charities. Rather it 
describes, and finds wanting, stylized versions of five common justifications 
for granting nonprofit organizations special tax status: (1) public goods, (2) 
agency, (3) altruism, (4) imperfect consumers, and (5) administrability. Be-
fore turning to the merit of these justifications for nonprofit tax exemption, 
we address some assumptions that motivate the calls for for-profit charity.  
III. Investigating the Assumptions:  
Efficiency and Compensation  
Commentators frequently assume that “[n]onprofits are inherently less 
efficient than for-profit businesses.”58 This generally reflects a faith in the 
purifying effects of market competition, which is thought to be stiffer in the 
case of for-profit markets than in nonprofit markets. There is also an unre-
flective and widespread use of business terminology in the charitable sector, 
reflecting the belief that for-profits are more efficient than nonprofits.  
According to David Pozen, commentators understand “social  
entrepreunership” as involving “a nonprofit organization adopting business 
                                                                                                                      
 55. The article is silent on whether for-profit charities would be subject to the same oversight 
and restrictions as nonprofit charities, such as attorney general oversight, cy pres proceedings, state 
fundraising restrictions, and federal lobbying restrictions.  
 56. See, e.g., Billiteri, supra note 13, at 2 (stating that the nonprofit world “often lacks the 
market efficiencies of commercial enterprise”); Avner Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui, Introduction, in 
The Nonprofit Sector in the Mixed Economy, 11 (Avner Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui eds., 1993) 
(noting that “[i]n perfectly competitive markets with no externalities and with symmetric informa-
tion nonprofit behavior is suboptimal relative to for-profit behavior”); David Easley & Maureen 
O’Hara, The economic role of the nonprofit firm, 14 Bell J. Econ. 531, 532 (1983) (analyzing a 
model in which the nondistribution constraint makes nonprofits inefficient).  
 57. E.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? 113 
Q.J. Econ. 653, 654 (1998). 
 58. Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1677, 1679 n.12 (2009) (noting that “[o]nly where consumers require additional 
protections that nonprofits supply—such as in the case of securing public goods or supplying third 
parties with aid—is a nonprofit the preferable model”). Henry Hansmann offers a more balanced 
assessment, noting that the relative efficiencies of nonprofits and for-profits “depend[] upon the 
factors that actually motivate the managers of for-profit and nonprofit firms.” Henry B. Hansmann, 
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale. L.J. 835, 878 (1980). 
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best-practices and a business mindset, and maybe also starting a for-profit 
offshoot, to become more efficient, effective, and sustainable in the pursuit 
of its traditional objectives.”59 Or, alternatively, “some take social entrepre-
neurship to be essentially the same phenomenon as capitalist 
entrepreneurship, except with a social, as opposed to a profit-based, mo-
tive.”60 The underlying idea is that for-profit forms are pragmatic, efficient, 
and successful, and to have the same successes, nonprofits must mimick 
their behavior: 
Old-style charity is out. Performance metrics, business jargon, “venture 
philanthropy,” collaboration with for-profit partners, and cost savings are 
in. In this climate of skepticism about the efficacy and efficiency of tradi-
tional charity, those who want to promote a robust vision of the nonprofit 
sector have an added incentive to appropriate the entrepreneurial label.61 
A. Efficiency and Compensation 
Knowing whether nonprofits are less efficient than for-profits requires 
evaluating comparable nonprofits and for-profits—those that, among other 
things, have the same goals and produce the same goods. Finding compara-
ble institutions is a notoriously difficult exercise. 
Instead of relying on empirical evidence, therefore, Malani and Posner 
theorize that for-profits are more efficient than nonprofits because of intrin-
sic differences in their compensation schemes. Owners and executives of 
for-profit firms generally receive performance-based compensation, which 
both motivates high levels of attention and effort and attracts managers who 
are confident in their capabilities.62 These benefits of performance-tailored 
compensation are presumably lost if managers are paid like bureaucrats, 
which is generally not true of the corporate sector of U.S. businesses,63 but 
may be characteristic of nonprofits. 
There is an important distinction here between what is and what must 
be. Malani and Posner appear to presume that nonprofits may only pay their 
managers fixed salaries,64 this presumption doubtless stemming from the 
                                                                                                                      
 59. David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 283, 296 
(2008). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 321. 
 62. Pallotta’s claims are similar, although he tends to focus on the sheer size of for-profit 
compensation. See Pallotta, supra note 51, at 62–63 tbls. 2–3 (comparing the salaries of the high-
est paid for-profit health insurance executives and health charity executives). As Pallotta 
acknowledges, he excludes highly paid hospital CEOs. 
 63. See, e.g., Hall & Liebman, supra note 57, at 653. 
 64. See, e.g., Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2043 (“If an entrepreneur forms a nonprofit 
firm, she will receive only a fixed income. If her cost structure is such that she can make profits 
(revenues minus costs, including her salary) even at the competitive price for her output, she will not 
be able to take that profit home as income.”). It is a common misunderstanding that for-profits may 
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requirement that a nonprofit is exempt under § 501(c)(3) only if “no part of 
the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or indi-
vidual.”65 This requirement does not, however, mean that salaries must be 
fixed. The IRS recognizes that, “when there are adequate safeguards, bene-
fits derived from incentive compensation plans accrue not only to the 
affected employee, but also to the charitable employer through increased 
productivity or cost stability, thus adding to, rather than detracting from, the 
accomplishment of their exempt purpose.”66 Nonprofits, therefore, may 
structure executive compensation so that it varies with quantity or quality of 
output, including verifiables such as safe water to poor countries. These are 
the very things that donors do and charities ought to care about.  
The IRS may even permit nonprofit employers to structure a salary 
based on net earnings if it is done without conferring an excess benefit or a 
private benefit on a shareholder or other individual, although the extent to 
which this is possible remains uncertain; after withdrawing proposed stan-
dards for when a revenue-sharing transaction would amount to an excess 
benefit in 2001, Treasury has yet to develop final regulations.67 However, a 
1987 exempt organizations continuing professional education text noted:  
This is not to imply that a salary based on net earnings is per se improper 
. . . . Prohibited inurement would result from such an arrangement only 
when all the facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship indicate 
a conferral of private benefit without a corresponding achievement of an 
exempt purpose. The compensation arrangement can reflect a low potential 
for substantial conflicts of interest if the plan is adequately limited and sa-
feguarded against abuse.68  
Nonprofits do not have carte blanche in compensating their executives. 
But neither do for-profits. The law requires nonprofits to set executive com-
pensation at a reasonable level, a standard set by compensation markets that 
may include for-profit firms. Similar restrictions forbid for-profits from de-
                                                                                                                      
 65. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 66. Health Care Update, in Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Educa-
tion Technical Instruction Program for the Fiscal Year 1987, pt. 3(A) (1987). According to 
the ABA Coordinating Committee on Nonprofit Governance, “Executives (and directors if appropri-
ate) should be compensated fairly and in a manner that reflects their contribution to the 
organization. Such compensation . . . may include incentives that correspond to success or failure in 
meeting performance goals.” ABA Coordinating Committee on Nonprofit Governance, 
Guide to Nonprofit Governance in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley 18 (2005) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 67. Fremont-Smith, supra note 15, at 257–58; Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5 (2008) (still noted 
as reserved as of July 2008).  
 68. Health Care Update, supra note 66, pt. 3(A). In the health care context, after a period of 
relative permissiveness regarding revenue-sharing joint ventures between physicians and hospitals, 
the IRS has tightened its restrictions on joint ventures and now seems to require limits on private 
gains that would be paid by the nonprofit entity. See Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensa-
tion in Tax-Exempt Organizations: Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 Tulane L. 
Rev. 819 (1997). 
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ducting salary or other compensation that is “unreasonable.”69 Therefore, the 
hypothetical entrepreneur that motivates Malani and Posner’s article may 
very well find that operating her clean-water operation as a for-profit won’t 
help her achieve her goal of “maintaining a comfortable lifestyle” any better 
than would operating a nonprofit charity.70 
Interestingly, nonprofits face the same constraints since excess benefit 
regulations71 refer back to sections of the code governing reasonableness in 
for-profit compensation.72 The code requires reasonable compensation, or 
the amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enter-
prises, whether taxable or tax exempt, under like circumstances. Although it 
is not forbidden to do so, if a nonprofit only uses for-profit comparables in 
determining executive compensation, it is more likely to capture the atten-
tion of the IRS.73  
In addition to reasonableness limitations on nonprofit executive pay, 
there are two other important restrictions on nonprofit compensation. The 
compensation scheme must not violate (1) private inurement restrictions 
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), and (2) private benefit rules under Treasury regula-
tions.74 But by carefully designing incentives, nonprofits may still achieve 
the hypothetical entrepreneur’s second goal in choosing a for-profit form: 
compensating employees with payments akin to equity-based or  
                                                                                                                      
 69. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) allows for-profit entities a tax deduction for a “reasonable allowance 
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered.” I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) 
(2006). Regulations state that the “test of deductibility in the case of compensation payments is 
whether they are reasonable and are in fact payments purely for services.” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) 
(2008).  
 70. Making more money is one of the hypothetical entrepreneur’s motivations for wanting to 
form a for-profit charity. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2019.  
 71. Nonprofits are subject to I.R.C. § 4958, which defines “excess benefit transaction” as 
“any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization 
directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit 
provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for 
providing such benefit.” I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2006).  
 72. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4 (2008). 
 73. For more detail, see Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the 
Sky the Limit? 76 Fordham L. Rev. 735, 737, 741–44 (2007). There has been some uncertainty 
over the past several years regarding whether pay that is reasonable under I.R.C. § 4958, and there-
fore does not constitute an excess benefit transaction, might nonetheless violate I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
This issue was raised in discussing the risks of revenue sharing arrangements in a recent IRS Ex-
empt Organization division phone forum in which a representative of the division noted that “while 
4958 might not apply to a revenue sharing arrangement with non disqualified persons, you still may 
have a private benefit issue, depending on how many employees are involved and how extensive the 
sharing.” Internal Revenue Service, Executive Compensation Phone Forum 12, May 17–18, 2006, 
http:// www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/may_17_final_script_exec_comp_phone_forum.pdf. 
 74. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008). The private inurement rules 
prohibit any degree of private ownership of nonprofits and are typically thought to embody the 
nonprofit nondistribution constraint. The private benefit restrictions protect the charitable purposes 
of a nonprofit by prohibiting anything but an incidental benefit to accrue to private parties. See 
Manny, supra note 73, at 744–47, for an excellent review of the rules and their differences. For even 
more detail, see Harvey P. Dale, The Crux of Charity: Inurement, Private Benefit, and Excess Bene-
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revenue-based compensation.75 However, as Malani and Posner recognize, 
profit-sharing may be limited to workers who do not exercise control over 
the nonprofit.76 Still, none of this means that the law forbids nonprofits from 
offering executives and other employees incentives to achieve nonprofit 
goals. 
Despite being permitted to do so, nonprofits may in practice be less like-
ly than for-profits to use incentive pay.77 But reliable comparisons of 
nonprofit and for-profit behavior, including the use of incentive pay, are 
hard to come by since there are few industries in which comparable non-
profits and for-profits compete.78 It is even difficult to find absolute 
estimates of incentive pay to nonprofit employees. Some older research 
shows that nonprofit hospital administrators were more likely to use set 
raises rather than performance-based raises in 1956,79 but more recent stud-
ies on whether nonprofit managerial pay is linked to performance are 
indeterminate.80 Anecdotal evidence suggests that nonprofits are increas-
ingly interested in linking pay to performance, but some fear that doing so 
risks their tax exemption.81 Nonprofit-management texts address various 
forms of incentive pay such as merit pay, but warn that incentive pay sys-
tems must be designed carefully.82 Text authors warn, for example, that 
                                                                                                                      
 75. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2019 (“Or perhaps the entrepreneur and donors be-
lieve that she cannot motivate her employees to work hard unless he can offer them a share of the 
firm’s profits.”). In discussing the factors used to determine whether an executive’s compensation is 
reasonable, the IRS notes:  
A third element listed in the G.C.M. [General Counsel Memorandum 38905, June 11, 1982] 
requires that the amount of compensation not be dependent principally upon incoming revenue 
of the exempt organization, but rather upon the accomplishment of the objective of the com-
pensatory contract. In the context of “reasonable magnitude of compensation,” this factor 
emphasizes that the salary level should be based mainly on how effectively and efficiently the 
executive performs his duties and runs the hospital operations in order to further the hospital’s 
charitable and educational purposes.  
Health Care Update, supra note 66, pt. 3(A). According to Treasury regulations, “[t]he fact that a 
compensation arrangement is subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness 
of compensation,” thus possibly placing a practical limit on the extent of incentive compensation. 
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2002). 
 76. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2065 n.66. 
 77. This may be, in part, because of public perception. See Pallotta, supra note 51. 
 78. For a thorough summary of empirical research in nonprofit compensation, see Kevin 
F. Hallock, Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations, (Cornell Univ. Faculty Publ’ns—Human 
Res. Studies, 2000), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1017&context=hrpubs.  
 79. Kenneth W. Clarkson, Some Implications of Property Rights in Hospital Management, 15 
J.L. & Econ. 363 (1972).  
 80. Kevin F. Hallock, Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits, 41 Indus. 
Rel. 377 (2002). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Joan E. Pynes, Human Resources Management for Public and Nonprofit 
Organizations, 243–49 (2d ed. 2004); see also Robert L. Heneman, Merit Pay: Linking Pay 
Increases to Performance Ratings (1992); Edward E. Lawler III, Rewarding Excellence: 
Pay Strategies for the New Economy 159–64 (2000); James L. Perry, Compensation, Merit 
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employees may game the compensation system by setting artificially low 
goals when their pay is based on achievement.83 
Even if there were reliable evidence that for-profits are more likely than 
nonprofits to use incentive pay to motivate employees, it would not follow 
that nonprofits or their managers were less efficient.84 Compensation 
schemes vary, even within sectors, because needs differ. Although nonprofit 
managers are certainly motivated by money, they may have intrinsic motiva-
tion that generally requires fewer financial incentives for high performance 
than do their for-profit counterparts. Nonprofit employees may be more loy-
al to their employers than for-profit employees if, as is often alleged, 
nonprofits provide more “pleasant amenities on their job, such as flexible 
hours, more stable job prospects, . . . a slower pace of work” or control over 
their working environments.85 Moreover, the use of performance-based 
schemes in the nonprofit sector could have adverse consequences both be-
cause the relevant performance is so difficult to measure and because the 
characteristics of those who choose managerial positions with performance-
based pay are not those that are best suited to pursue nonprofit missions.  
The limited available evidence shows that nonprofit and for-profit em-
ployees have different observable characteristics. Nonprofit employees, for 
example, tend to be older and more educated, and are much more likely to 
be female than for-profit employees.86 Differences in employee demograph-
ics indicate that nonprofit and for-profit employees might respond 
differently to incentives, or that the most effective incentives differ in the 
two sectors. The strongest evidence on this point is that, despite their ability 
to tie compensation to performance, there is not much evidence that non-
profits do so. Presumably this is because either performance-based 
compensation would have undesirable effects, or else that a failure of com-
petition in the nonprofit market means that inefficient practices have not 
been eradicated. 
It is tempting to conjecture that for-profits have an advantage over non-
profits due to the relative ease of measuring performance. After all, profits 
have the virtue of being easily counted, and if an organization’s goal is to 
make profits, then it is hard to think of a better measure. But in the case a 
                                                                                                                      
Pay, and Motivation, in Public Personnel Administration: Problems and Prospects 143 (Ste-
ven W. Hays & Richard C. Kearney eds., 4th ed. 2002).  
 83. Pynes, supra note 82, at 244 (citing Wayne F. Cascio, Applied Psychology in Per-
sonnel Management (4th ed. 1991); Edward E. Lawler III, Pay for Performance: A Strategic 
Analysis, in 3 Compensation and Benefits 3-136 (Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ed. 1989)).  
 84. Malani and Posner suggest that if an owner cannot take shares in a charity, she will either 
(1) not open the charity, or (2) will open a charity that “will not be as productive or efficient” as the 
hypothetical for-profit charity would have been. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2019. 
 85. Hallock, supra note 80, at 382–83. It may also be the case that nonprofit employees pay 
for those amenities in forgone wages rather than dedication. Of course the tax system effectively 
subsidizes (by not taxing) nonpecuniary employee compensation that takes such forms, though this 
subsidy is available to for-profit firms as well as nonprofits. Cf. Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption 
Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L.J. 1081, 1096 (1980) (discussing the inappropriate-
ness of taxing benefits to the psyche).  
 86. Hallock, supra note 78, at 38.  
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nonprofit organization, whose goal is the provision of public goods, a profit 
measure is unlikely to capture good performance. This leaves the analyst in 
the difficult position of comparing the outputs of organizations with differ-
ent objectives; but just because one cannot easily measure nonprofit output 
does not mean that it is insufficient.  
The difficulty of measuring nonprofit output creates problems beyond 
the risk that observers might underestimate the value of nonprofit produc-
tion. By the same reasoning, the manager of a hybrid organization who 
successfully earns profits on the for-profit side may or may not be success-
ful in providing public goods on the nonprofit side, making it difficult to 
know how to incentivize and reward such managers. And even in the strictly 
for-profit sector, recent events call attention to the fact that for-profit corpo-
rate compensation systems do not always successfully incentivize managers 
to maximize long-run profits. As anecdotal evidence that for-profits dispro-
portionately attract top talent through huge compensation packages, Dan 
Pallotta lists the total compensation of five corporate leaders.87 These in-
clude the former C.E.O. of KB Home, Bruce Karat, who voluntarily retired 
after backdating stock options and has since been indicted,88 and the former 
C.E.O. of Lehman Brothers, R.S. Fuld, Jr., who oversaw the decline of the 
storied bank into bankruptcy.89 
Finally, it remains true that, in those circumstances in which for-profits 
are in fact more productive than their nonprofit counterparts, nonprofit or-
ganizations can harness the skills of for-profits by hiring them on a contract 
basis. Examples are plentiful: nonprofit hospitals often hire for-profit man-
agement companies; and nonprofit schools, particularly charter schools, 
work with for-profit service providers.90 In more extreme versions of such 
contracting, nonprofits can and do establish for-profit subsidiaries that are 
taxable but nonetheless may create beneficial opportunities to exploit as-
pects of for-profit organization.91 The virtue of arms-length contracting with 
                                                                                                                      
 87. Pallotta, supra note 51, at 70. 
 88. William Heisel, KB Home ex-CEO Bruce Karatz accused of stock option fraud, L.A. 
Times, Mar. 6, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/06/business/fi-karatz6; Former KB 
Home CEO’s severance pay eyed, MSNBC, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
15813494; Judge: Evidence Allowed in ex-KB Home Chief Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/11/09/business/AP-US-KB-Home-Backdating.html?_r=2&scp 
=1&sq=%22kb%20home%22&st=cse.  
 89. An Epidemic of Capital Destruction, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/weekinreview/13word.html?_r=1&scp=23&sq=Richard+S.+fu
ld&st=nyt; Analysts blame CEO’s overconfidence for Lehman’s bankruptcy, SiliconIndia, Sept. 
17, 2008, http://www.siliconindia.com/shownews/Analysts_blame_CEOs_overconfidence_for__ 
Lehmans_bankruptcy-nid-46694.html (blaming Fuld personally for the collapse of Lehman); An-
drew Clark, You might think Lehman boss Fuld would be chastened, Guardian, Oct. 8, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/08/lehmanbrothers.banking1 (reporting Fuld’s un-
apologetic testimony before Congress); One year later, Lehman alumni move on, Sify, Sept. 14, 
2009, http://sify.com/finance/one-year-later-lehman-alumni-move-on-news-international-jjokEleeijg.html. 
 90. John Morley, For-Profit And Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Costs Approach, 115 
Yale L.J. 1782, 1789–93 (2006). 
 91. See, e.g., Howard P. Tuckman, The Strategic and Economic Value of Hybrid Nonprofit 
Structures, in Nonprofits & Business, supra note 13, at 129.  
20
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 15 [2010]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art15
HINES FINAL B.DOC 4/5/2010 1:29 PM 
May 2010] The Attack on Nonprofit Status 1199 
 
for-profit providers is that it maintains a separation between the pursuit of 
charitable mission and the retention of profits, thereby avoiding some of the 
incentive problems created by combining the two organizational goals. 
B. Bringing Competition into the Picture 
Arguments for the superior efficiency of for-profits are commonly based 
on the inaccurate notion that for-profits face robust competition, while  
nonprofits do not compete at all. Neither caricature is true. Many for-profits 
face little competition, and nonprofits do not operate in isolation. In evaluat-
ing the efficiency of each type, one needs to know how nonprofits and  
for-profits behave in comparable markets, and how nonprofits and for-
profits react when operating in the same market (or are facing the threat of 
interaction). Knowing this is critical for disaggregating the effects of  
ownership and competition, but there are few reliable data. Moreover, view-
ing nonprofits as competitors sheds a different light on the nonprofit form. 
How competitive is the nonprofit sector? In 2006, there were over 1.9 
million nonprofit organizations in the United States.92 These numbers alone 
suggest a degree of competition that makes it unlikely that nonprofit organi-
zations could overlook or fail to be influenced by intense competition. It is 
an understatement to say that the last 500 years of Western civilization have 
been shaped by competition among religious organizations, a process that 
continues to this day, and is equally, though more subtly, replayed in mar-
kets for nonprofit activities. The virtue of markets is that they provide a 
forum for competition, and as Adam Smith and every subsequent thoughtful 
observer has noted, it is the competition, rather than the profits, that  
generates the benefits we associate with markets.93  
Although we cannot offer quantitative measures of nonprofit competi-
tion, it is worth canvassing the many ways in which nonprofits compete. 
Nonprofits compete with the other (almost two million) nonprofits, as well 
as with for-profit and government firms. First, they compete on the demand 
side. Just like for-profits, they need inputs such as employees, land, and  
capital to function. In some cases, as in labor markets for lower-level staff, 
they will be quite similarly situated to for-profits. In fact, the overall wage 
differential between nonprofits and for-profits is zero.94 It seems implausi-
ble, for example, that there are many specialty nonprofit or for-profit 
carpenters.  
But there are systematic differences between ownership types regarding 
some input costs, such as the cost of land. Because of their property tax ex-
emptions, nonprofits may have a competitive advantage over for-profits in 
                                                                                                                      
 92. Indep. Sector, Facts and Figures about Charitrable Organizations (2009), 
http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/Charitable_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 
19, 2009). 
 93. 1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Na-
tions 73–81 (R. H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776). 
 94. Eleanor Brown & Al Slivinski, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in The Non-
profit Sector, supra note 4, at 140, 142.  
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buying land. To know whether this is true, of course, depends on identifying 
the underlying value of the land for different uses. But even if nonprofits are 
favored over for-profits in the acquisition of land, this does not mean that 
nonprofits fail to compete. Nonprofits with property tax exemptions will 
compete with each other for that input, and they will frequently do so on 
equal footing.95  
It is similarly difficult to generalize about competition for capital. For-
profits and nonprofits often compete for the same user fees, particularly in 
the healthcare industry. They might directly compete for grants and govern-
ment contracts, and those markets may or may not be competitive. In fact, 
nonprofits and for-profit hospitals both make substantial use of debt, and 
some have proposed that, relative to for-profits, nonprofits face tighter con-
straints on capital because of limits on access to debt markets.96  
The market for donations, which account for only one-fifth of the sec-
tor’s revenues, is largely, although surprisingly not entirely, limited to 
nonprofit competitors.97 Even some for-profits benefit from donations, both 
in the form of money and volunteer labor. For example, for-profit, privately 
owned daycares have scholarship funds and parent-teacher associations that 
are funded, at least in part, with private donations. They also have work days 
in which parents and other community members volunteer their labor to 
spruce up classrooms and fix climbing structures. For-profit hospitals man-
age active volunteer programs.98  
The research on fundraising typically models the relationship between 
donors and nonprofits, but it does not identify the level of competition in 
markets for donations.99 So how do we know that nonprofits compete for 
donations? Susan Rose-Ackerman’s work,100 in which she models fundrais-
ing as a highly competitive analogue to advertising, notes that there are 
purely informational purposes for advertising—consumers need to find your 
product and your firm—but this explanation may carry few implications for 
nonprofits. Unless fundraising is terribly inefficient, the large volume of 
                                                                                                                      
 95. Some nonprofits make payments in lieu of taxes rather than paying local property taxes, 
though these voluntary payments are small compared to the property tax liabilities of firms without 
tax exemptions. 
 96. Frank & Salkever, supra note 6, at 133; Timothy J. Goodspeed & Daphne A. Kenyon, 
The Nonprofit Sector’s Capital Constraint: Does It Provide a Rationale for the Tax Exemption 
Granted to Nonprofit Firms?, 21 Pub. Fin. Q. 415 (1993). 
 97. Indep. Sector & Urban Inst., The New Nonprofit Almanac & Desk Reference 
54–56 (Murray S. Weitzman et al. eds., 2002). 
 98. See, e.g., Alleghany Regional Hospital, Volunteer Opportunities, http:// 
www.alleghanyregional.com/CustomPage.asp?guidCustomContentID=C5A2C1E8–584D-
4DB6-B1A7-203ACF38EE51 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (for-profit hospital seeking volun-
teers).  
 99. James Andreoni, Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1186 
(1998); Brown & Slivinski, supra note 94, at 143–46; John J. Havens et al., Charitable Giving: How 
Much, by Whom, to What, and How?, in The Nonprofit Sector, supra note 4, at 542. 
 100. E.g., The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Pol-
icy (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Charitable Giving and “Excessive” 
Fundraising, 97 Q.J. Econ. 193, 194 (1982). 
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appeals from a single organization to the same donor suggests that they are 
not simply educational.101 Further, nonprofits need not produce the same 
good to engage in rigorous competition for donations. Eleanor Brown and 
Al Slivinski explain that the Rose-Ackerman fundraising model “recalls the 
standard economic notion of monopolistic competition: there are many non-
profit establishments competing for donations via fundraising, each of them 
producing a distinct mix of services determined by the preferences of the 
nonprofit’s owner-manager, in a market with no barriers to entry.”102 Inde-
pendent charity-rating agencies do not restrict their ratings to single types of 
charitable causes, but rate charities across industries so that donors may 
choose among them.103  
That stereotype brings to mind an image of the impecuniousness non-
profit organization compared to its for-profit cousins hardly implies that the 
level of competition is less intense; if anything, the reverse should be ex-
pected. Threadbare organizations tend to be the most intense competitors, 
since their existences hang in the balance, whereas wealthy organizations 
have the ability, and the observed proclivity, not to compete as intensely.104  
Nonprofits also compete quite aggressively to supply goods and ser-
vices. As Brown and Slivinski explain:  
The provision of services puts nonprofits squarely in the role of market 
participants. Even when their missions can be pursued without recourse to 
market transactions (serving a clientele who do not pay for services, for 
example), nonprofits must make decisions about quality, quantity, and 
prices charged for ancillary services. They have choices to make about the 
provision of mission-related services to mission-extraneous clients (as by a 
health clinic designed to serve the poor but open to all) and of other ser-
vices that can generate net revenue to subsidize mission-fulfilling 
activities.105  
Moreover, empirical evidence supports the notion that nonprofits com-
pete, often directly, with other types of firms. There are nonprofit, 
government, and for-profit hospitals in the same town. The daycare market 
is split among all three forms as well (60 percent nonprofit and government, 
including a small number of publicly run centers, and 40 percent for-
profit).106 In fact, the authors’ children have attended all three types. What 
                                                                                                                      
 101. Appeals that succeed in eliciting contributions from other donors may convey informa-
tion, however. See Lise Vesterlund, The informational value of sequential fundraising, 87 J. Pub. 
Econ. 627 (2003). 
 102. Brown & Slivinski, supra note 94, at 143. 
 103. See, e.g., Better Business Bureau, http://www.bbb.org/us/charity (last visited Oct. 19, 
2009); Charity Navigator, http://charitynavigator.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 104. Economics Nobel laureate J.R. Hicks notably observed that “[t]he best of all monopoly 
profits is a quiet life.” J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 
Econometrica 1, 8 (1935). 
 105. Brown & Slivinski, supra note 94, at 146.  
 106. John R. Morris & Suzanne W. Helburn, Child Care Center Quality Differences: The Role 
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about entertainment? Theater companies are a mix of forms, and audiences 
choose between watching a for-profit band or a nonprofit symphony on a 
given night.  
Since there are almost two million nonprofits, one would expect tremen-
dous competition within the sector, even without competition from other 
types. But how competitive are these markets? Markets vary in terms of 
competitiveness and other characteristics, and this makes it difficult to draw 
general conclusions about the relative efficiency of various ownership types 
without more detail regarding how they compete. Although there is little 
research attempting to disaggregate nonprofit ownership and market effects, 
there is a large body of relevant research comparing public and private pro-
duction. For example, Douglas Caves and Laurits Christensen’s research 
addressed the common but unsubstantiated assertion that private ownership 
leads to more efficient production than public ownership.107 They noted that 
the claims did not account for efficiency differences based on market struc-
ture. Comparing two very large Canadian railroads operating in a 
competitive environment—one private and one public—they found “no evi-
dence of inferior efficiency performance by the government-owned railroad” 
and, in fact, some evidence that the public railroad had achieved higher pro-
ductivity gains.108 This research holds some important lessons for nonprofit 
scholarship.  
Finally, even if giving for-profits the incentive to enter traditionally non-
profit markets would make those markets more competitive, doing so might 
decrease social welfare. The largest nonreligious, nonprofit markets include 
many for-profit entities such as nursing homes, hospitals, and schools. Em-
pirical studies of nursing homes suggest that the existence of more 
nonprofits in a market is associated with higher output quality.109 If quality is 
underprovided by competitive markets, then there will be circumstances in 
which encouraging for-profit entry by giving them incentives to produce 
greater numbers of charitable goods would depress quality and undermine a 
policy goal that motivates the nonprofit tax subsidy.110  
                                                                                                                      
 107. Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen, The Relative Efficiency of Public and Pri-
vate Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 958, 
959–60 (1980). 
 108. Id. at 960–61.  
 109. Richard A. Hirth, Consumer information and competition Between nonprofit and for-
profit nursing homes, 18 J. Health Econ. 219, 234–36 (1999) [hereinafter Hirth, Consumer Infor-
mation]; cf. Richard A. Hirth, Competition Between For-profit and Nonprofit Health Care Providers: 
Can it Help Achieve Social Goals?, 54 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 414, 425–26 (1997) [hereinafter 
Hirth, Competition].  
 110. This is analogous to the analysis of Kotchen, who considers a model in which the intro-
duction of “green goods” provided by for-profit firms may either increase or reduce total 
contributions to the environment (here counting the “green” component of green goods as contribu-
tions to the environment), since green purchases from for-profit firms typically crowd out more 
direct contributions to nonprofit environmental causes. Kotchen, supra note 54, at 828–31. 
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Similarly, although many studies find little difference between for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals in quality or efficiency of production,111 these studies 
often overlook ways in which nonprofits might offer superior services. For 
example, for-profit hospitals show a dramatic increase in the likelihood of 
offering medical services when they are profitable that disappears when they 
are unprofitable. It is hard to imagine that the reimbursement system accu-
rately prices these services to reflect quality concerns. Rather, the findings 
suggest that for-profits chase profits at the expense of quality.112  
For-profit ownership also has spillover effects, and to the extent for-
profit behavior is undesirable, increasing for-profit market share is undesir-
able. In markets with both nonprofit and for-profit firms—e.g., markets 
where producer and consumer roles are typically somewhat mixed and 
prices are largely unobserved—characterizing how firms interact under oli-
gopoly or other competitive settings is difficult at best. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to expect that an increased share of for-profit providers in a mar-
ket may influence the equilibrium behavior of both for-profits and 
nonprofits in various ways. For example, if for-profit hospitals successfully 
attract the most profitable patients (perhaps by forgoing services that are 
disproportionately attractive to poor patients, by offering greater hotel ser-
vices and other amenities, or by aggressively billing and rebilling less 
profitable patients), it is plausible that their behavior puts price pressure on 
nonprofits in the same markets. Nonprofits might then have to restrict output 
or else position themselves to attract more profitable patients and proce-
dures. Horwitz and Nichols offer evidence of the latter behavior, as a rising 
share of for-profit hospitals in a market is associated with behavior on the 
part of nonprofit hospitals that more closely resembles that of their for-profit 
competitors.113  
IV. Taking Nonprofit Charities Seriously 
As discussed above, Malani and Posner frame their endorsement of for-
profit charities through a critique of five arguments commonly made to jus-
tify public support of the nonprofit form. We review in detail the four most 
significant of these arguments: (A) public goods, (B) agency, (C) altruism, 
and (D) imperfect consumers.114 
                                                                                                                      
 111. For a useful review, see Frank A. Sloan, Not-for-Profit Ownership and Hospital Behav-
ior, in 1B Handbook of Health Economics 1141 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 
2000); cf. Mark Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray, How Nonprofits Matter In American Medicine, 
And What To Do About It, 25 Health Aff. w287 (2006). 
 112. Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 139 (2007); Jill 
R. Horwitz, Making Profits and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit, And Government 
Hospitals, 24 Health Aff. 790 (2005) (demonstrating that for-profit hospitals are significantly 
more responsive to financial incentives to offer or avoid medical services than are comparable non-
profit hospitals).  
 113. Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, Hospital Ownership and Medical Services: Market 
Mix, Spillover Effects, and Nonprofit Objectives, 28 J. Health Econ. 924–37 (2009). 
 114. We do not review the fifth argument—that their proposal for for-profit charities does not 
raise difficult problems for administration—because it is the least significant of the arguments and 
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Naturally there are other justifications for tying nonprofit status to bene-
fits. These include Boris Bittker and George Rahdert’s income-defining 
theory, which Malani and Posner dismiss in a footnote as unproblematic for 
their theory, as well as noneconomic theories based on sovereignty and 
moral obligations that the authors disregard.115 Even within the economic 
paradigm that Malani and Posner embrace, however, their argument war-
rants reconsideration.  
A. Public Goods and Positive Externalities 
The argument for for-profit charities begins with a critique of what Ma-
lani and Posner term the “public goods theory.” If a firm produces a good or 
service with public-good attributes, meaning a positive externality, then for-
profits, or anyone else motivated solely by private interest, will produce too 
little of the good. This is because consumers consider their own marginal 
private benefits rather than the greater marginal social benefits when decid-
ing how much they are willing to pay for the good. A common example of a 
good with a positive externality is education. Better-educated people make 
better citizens, improve the quality of democratic decision making, are less 
likely to lead lives of crime, and otherwise contribute positively to the lives 
of others. When a student decides to purchase education, she typically con-
siders only how much she or her family might benefit from her knowledge, 
rather than how much the rest of society might benefit, so she has an incen-
tive to purchase too little education. 
There are many potential solutions to this problem. The state could sub-
sidize producers (e.g., with grants to universities) or consumers (e.g., with 
low-interest government loans to students) by the amount of the excess of 
marginal social benefit over marginal private benefit.116 Alternatively, the 
government could regulate output or prices. Or it might simply produce the 
good directly, a solution that Malani and Posner reject because of the diffi-
culty government faces in determining and aggregating preferences. They 
endorse subsidies as being less cumbersome than the other solutions, and 
further argue that if government support of charities is premised on the pub-
lic-good nature of what charities do, then there is no reason to subsidize 
only nonprofits, but also for-profits producing the same goods.117 
                                                                                                                      
others have ably discussed the difficulties the IRS would face in distinguishing between charitable and 
non-charitable for-profits. Professor Victor Fleischer raises concerns about administration of a new 
system in Victor Fleischer, Response, “For Profit Charity”: Not Quite Ready for Prime Time, 93 Va. L. 
Rev. In Brief 231 (2008), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/01/21/fleischer.pdf. 
 115. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2029 n.25. For other theories regarding justifications 
for nonprofit exemptions, see, for example, Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptual-
izing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. Corp. L. 585 (1998); Horwitz, supra note 15, at 1380–86.  
 116. The efficient subsidy rate is determined by marginal benefits at the socially optimal 
production or consumption level. The scheme of optimal corrective government subsidies was first 
proposed by A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 699–704 (4th ed. 1932). 
 117. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2064–67; see also Hyman & Sage, supra note 6, at 
w312 (naming similar arguments in response to the question they pose about nonprofit health pro-
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Even assuming the state knows which goods and how much it wants to 
subsidize, the issue is not as simple as one of encouraging public-good pro-
vision in all its forms, since provision by one type of organization influences 
provision by another.118 In fact, it is unlikely that a common subsidy rate will 
induce for-profits to provide the socially optimal output, given their residual 
profit motive and their disregard of the impact of their actions on competing 
nonprofits.119 The efficient subsidy rate needed to encourage entrepreneurs 
to set up their organizations as for-profits with charitable arms is generally 
not the same subsidy rate needed to stimulate the efficient level of charitable 
activity, particularly given spillover effects on the charitable activities of 
others. One-size-fits-all tax subsidies are seldom efficient, but in this case 
there is particular reason to expect that subsidies to for-profit firms may ex-
ceed efficient levels.  
B. Agency Theory 
A second reason to subsidize nonprofits based on status is that they are 
best positioned to solve information problems that arise in the provision of 
charitable goods. Henry Hansmann suggests that consumers or donors can-
not directly evaluate the quality or quantity of output. Consider his example 
of donors who pay $10 to have CARE ship and distribute milk to hungry 
children abroad.120 Under circumstances with less geographic distance be-
tween donors and beneficiaries, it might still be difficult for donors to verify 
that their donation went to the intended beneficiaries. Moreover, trust is 
needed even in circumstances in which there is no external donor. After con-
suming medical treatment, for example, patients commonly cannot verify 
that a hospital provided the right treatment.121 Did the patient recover from 
his illness because of, in conjunction with, or even despite the medical care? 
Malani and Posner counter Hansmann’s suggestion by noting that not all 
purchasers “place value on the noncontractible quality that the nondistribu-
tion constraint protects,” as for-profits compete successfully in many 
markets with nonprofits, and, therefore they assume that consumers have 
ample measures of “verifiable quality.”122 Nonprofit status, therefore, may 
signal higher quality,123 and consumers can react accordingly.  
The idea that nonprofits and for-profits compete in the same market 
while occupying similar niches is quite familiar in economic research.  
                                                                                                                      
viders, “does it make any sense to subsidize some health care providers by exempting them from 
federal, state, and local taxes, based solely on institutional status?”). 
 118. Horwitz & Nichols, supra note 113. 
 119. Cf. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2048 (discussing altruism, acknowledging that 
the nonprofit form may well generate superior outcomes). 
 120. Hansmann, supra note 58, at 846 (1980). 
 121. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 941 (1963). 
 122. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2038–39. 
 123. But see Anup Malani & Guy David, Does Nonprofit Status Signal Quality?, 37 J. Legal 
Stud. 551, 573 (2008) (arguing that hospitals do not take nonprofit status to signal quality).  
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Professor Richard Hirth has developed a model featuring different types of 
nonprofits, including high or low output, nonprofits managed by either for-
profit or nonprofit entrepreneurs, and consumers who can or cannot verify 
the quality of output.124 Hirth analyzes a market where some entrepreneurs 
are for-profit in spirit yet nonetheless adopt the nonprofit organizational 
form to signal high quality. These entrepreneurs are sneaky: they operate 
for-profits in disguise, distributing revenues to themselves in the form of 
higher wages. They shirk on quality to earn higher profits, and are still able 
to attract uninformed consumers. (This works as long as there are not too 
many shirkers, so that nonprofits on average offer higher quality output than 
for-profits, and nonprofit status remains a reasonable signal of being a high-
quality provider despite the presence of some nonprofits that are really for-
profits in disguise.) Hirth therefore concludes that the presence of nonprofits 
in mixed markets increases overall quality.  
Despite the conclusion that nonprofits raise overall market quality, Ma-
lani and Posner still worry that it is the favorable tax treatment that allows 
for-profits in disguise to exist because it gives managers some cushion to 
shirk and still meet payroll. However, it is difficult to see how this problem 
would arise if there is sufficient competition among nonprofits, since in a 
competitive environment inefficient or wasteful producers are driven out of 
business by more efficient competitors. 
At this point, the Malani and Posner article is back on well-traveled ter-
rain. Endorsing contracting for charitable services rather than subsidizing 
entities based on status, the article asserts that a for-profit firm could equally 
well contract to distribute no profits to managers or workers, and that “un-
like quality, profits are verifiable.”125 If only it were so simple. The problem 
that donors face in determining whether insiders are receiving inappropriate 
compensation is difficult enough in the nonprofit context, but worse in the 
hypothesized case of for-profit charities. Is the football coach’s salary or 
contract buyout a legitimate cost of attracting talent? Imagine throwing 
profit-sharing into the mix. Donors have legal tools such as reversion inter-
ests and gift-overs that permit them to limit their financial commitments to 
nonprofit donees by creating rights on the part of donors or other charities to 
receive limited returns of invested capital should subsequent events warrant, 
thereby protecting them against some of the waste that the critique envi-
sions. Even if the donor does not have standing to sue the nonprofit for such 
waste, she does have the ability to tip off the attorney general, the local 
press, or the beneficiary of the gift-over. 
Finally, in an important footnote, Malani and Posner claim that a nondis-
tribution constraint is equivalent to a confiscatory tax on profits, but this is 
                                                                                                                      
 124. Hirth, Competition, supra note 109; Hirth, Consumer Information, supra note 109. Ma-
lani and Posner’s notion of a nonprofit charity operated by a nonaltruist also is reminiscent of the 
three models proposed by Mark Pauly and Michael Redisch, albeit with less formal development. 
Compare Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2034–35, with Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The 
Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians’ Cooperative, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 87, 88–90 (1973). 
 125. Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2035.  
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not quite right.126 More accurately, a nondistribution constraint is equivalent 
to a confiscatory tax on distributions. Since profits that are earned but not 
distributed can be used for exempt purposes that are important to nonprofit 
entrepreneurs, this is an important distinction. A refundable 100 percent tax 
rate on profits would make profit-motivated for-profit entrepreneurs indif-
ferent across all feasible levels of output, including not operating a firm at 
all. A nonprofit entrepreneur who maximizes something other than profits 
cares greatly about the organization’s output level and its financial health 
despite its inability to distribute profits to shareholders. 
C. Altruists  
Malani and Posner next examine whether altruism justifies subsidizing 
nonprofits based on status. They suggest that if altruists are differentially 
attracted to employment in nonprofits, then government subsidies to non-
profits (which reinvest profits in charity production) would have a bigger 
impact on charitable activity than subsidies to for-profits (which transfer 
profits to entrepreneurs).127 Malani and Posner begin their critique with the 
reasonable simplifying assumption that entrepreneurs care both about pro-
ducing some quantity of charitable output and about producing income.  
Their critique also assumes that nonprofits produce in a single market to 
the point at which they make no profits; so, in this market, total cost equals 
total revenue, or average cost (total cost divided by output quantity) equals 
average revenue (total revenue divided by output quantity). Producing at the 
level of output where profits are zero—the point where average cost equals 
average revenue—is generally not the efficient output level. (Since only in 
special cases will profits be zero at the efficient level of output, it follows 
that nonprofits constrained to break even will produce inefficient levels of 
output.) Rather, efficient output is characterized by the condition that mar-
ginal cost—the cost of producing a single additional unit of output—equals 
marginal benefit—the benefit associated with an additional unit of output. 
However, the assumption that firms must break even in a single market—the 
assumption that drives the conclusion that nonprofits produce at inefficient 
output levels—is unwarranted. The assumption that nonprofits produce at 
the point that average cost equals average revenue is not, in fact, an implica-
tion of the nondistribution constraint under which nonprofits labor. 
Although nonprofits may not distribute profits to shareholders, they can and 
do earn profits (and, at times, losses). They may retain their profits or invest 
them in related charitable purposes or new charitable enterprises.  
The problem identified by Malani and Posner—that profits are trapped 
inside nonprofit organizations and therefore must be devoted to subsidizing 
excessive production of altruistic goods—is one that arises only if organiza-
tions have no other uses for their funds. If instead nonprofits with resources 
to deploy can choose among alternative uses of these resources, then it no 
                                                                                                                      
 126. Id. at 2033 n.31. 
 127. Id. at 2044–55. 
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longer follows that they are pushed to produce to the point at which social 
costs exceed social benefits. This possibility is ruled out by a simple  
one-activity model of the world, but all that this means is that such simple 
textbook abstractions can produce misleading conclusions if taken too liter-
ally. 
Here we reproduce Figure 1 from the Malani and Posner article, with 
additional lines labeled ID (inverse demand), PMB (private marginal bene-
fit), and MR (marginal revenue corresponding to demand ID) superimposed 





qf3 qnt qf2 Quantity 


















Relying on Figure 1, Malani and Posner suggest that, unless a charity 
produces a public good, a nonprofit will produce too much of the good. This 
is because the charitable tax exemption allows them to produce at qnt, a 
quantity beyond which donors value the production of the product. It is cor-
rect that the nonprofit has the resources to support this production point. A 
tax subsidy might lead donors to choose the nonprofit form because the sub-
sidy allows for a big boost in production. And, as Malani and Posner 
conclude, the cost of production would be greater than the value of the price 
the donor is willing to pay for production plus the good feelings the donor 
would generate by producing at qnt. But this observation is beside the point. 
As explained in more detail below, it focuses on the wrong externality. The 
government is not trying to ensure that the production decision accounts for 
donors’ good feelings, but rather that the nonprofit subsidy is meant to in-
crease production of goods with particular public benefits.  
Malani and Posner further contend that even in the case of public goods, 
nonprofit production is not necessarily better since it is unclear whether 
nonprofits or for-profits are, from a social cost perspective, the least-cost 
suppliers of the good. According to the article, there is no reason to believe 
that altruistic managers face lower costs than profit-seeking managers, or 
that there are unconstrained supplies of altruists to run nonprofits. These 
arguments again rely on unstated assumptions, most notably that the activity 
depicted in the diagram is the only one available to the nonprofit. If this as-
sumption is incorrect—if, instead, nonprofits can deploy their resources in 
more than one way and are guided by truly altruistic motives—then the 
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nonprofit organization will not produce at the qnt point. The nonprofit will 
produce at the efficient point.  
Under our more realistic characterization of the opportunities to spend 
nonprofit funds, only if there exist no other opportunities for useful spend-
ing would a rational altruistic nonprofit choose to produce inefficiently. In 
extremis one could imagine a nonprofit organization simply contributing 
any saved resources to a foundation or other nonprofit, or, heaven forbid, the 
government. But these situations seldom arise, which suggests either that 
nonprofits behave irrationally or, much more likely, their opportunities for 
valuable expenditures have not diminished in the way suggested by the ra-
ther too simple Figure 1. 
There are other causes for concern with their analysis of Figure 1. First, 
although the article makes a reasonable simplifying assumption that chari-
ties face a constant output price pm, it fails to note the implications of the 
assumption. The flat line p, in Figure 1 implies either (1) perfect competi-
tion among suppliers of the good, or (2) perfectly elastic demand among 
consumers.  
What happens when the government subsidizes nonprofits in a perfectly 
competitive market with free entry by identical competitors? Consider the 
case of a property tax exemption, which would lower the average cost of 
nonprofits to ACt.
128 Profits would be lowered below the level where for-
profits could compete, and every for-profit would be driven out of the  
market without having any effect on the efficiency of production.  
If instead there is neither perfect competition nor perfectly elastic de-
mand, then a manager who values only total market output produces at the 
profit-maximizing choice qf1 and then uses the profits to purchase additional 
units of q at the fixed price pm. A manager who seeks to maximize output of 
the firm subject to the constraint that the firm not lose money would produce 
at qf3 where average cost AC equals average revenue pm (thus rectangular 
area ABCD, profit of a price-taking profit maximizer, is equal to the area of 
triangular area DGH). If there is sufficient demand to support output of mul-
tiple firms, this is an inefficiently high level of production. None of this 
analysis requires altruistic managers—only managers who are incentivized 
to pursue the objectives of the firm, profit-making or otherwise. Why would 
an entrepreneur or donor contribute capital to an output-maximizing non-
profit? This is where altruism may play a role. An entrepreneur or donor 
would contribute capital to these firms because they produce goods with 
positive externalities (i.e., some “community benefit” or “public benefit”), 
which is explicitly a condition of 501(c)(3) status. This situation is also one 
in which asymmetric information may play a role—if output is not directly 
observable, without further knowledge of market interactions, merely know-
ing that one type of firm always produces weakly higher output at a given 
price might lead donors to favor that type of firm.  
                                                                                                                      
 128. An income tax exemption would have no effect in this case, where income is measured 
as economic income, since economic income is zero with perfect competition.  
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Malani and Posner point out that a for-profit could also be induced to 
maximize output by designing incentives for the manager to maximize out-
put rather than profits. If this were effective, the for-profit would earn zero 
profits, and pay no taxes, as long as profits for tax purposes were to corre-
spond to economic profits. Thus, of the three major tax advantages a 
nonprofit enjoys, the first (no corporate income tax) appears irrelevant when 
comparing output-maximizing firms. Property tax and other exemptions and 
the deductibility of private donations (from itemizers) may generate re-
sources that increase output by shifting average costs from AC to ACt and 
output from qf3 to qnt. 
There remains the important question of whether a for-profit firm can 
credibly commit to maximizing output, and therefore not earning profits. In 
particular, owners of an output-maximizing firm always face an incentive to 
reduce production a little and earn positive profits, since marginal cost ex-
ceeds the market price.129 Even if firms could make a credible commitment 
to maximizing output, this would jeopardize the main advantage of the for-
profit corporate form—access to equity markets—because a for-profit that 
credibly commits to earning no profits could not raise capital in equity mar-
kets. 
Moreover, as mentioned briefly above, Malani and Posner’s worry that 
nonprofits might produce too much ignores the fact that charities produce 
goods with a “community benefit” or “public benefit,” goods that are under-
provided in the absence of corrective policy. The article’s argument rests on 
the assumption that the only relevant externality arises from the entrepre-
neur’s “warm glow” from generating higher output. This is not the 
externality that needs correcting.130 A manager of a clothing boutique may 
get a “warm glow” from generating higher output, or seeing more people 
wearing the store’s stylish output, but this is not an externality we seek to 
correct with the nonprofit form. Similarly, donors of birthday presents may 
get a “warm glow,” but birthday presents are not tax deductible for good 
reason. This use of “warm glow” as the sole externality, therefore, picks up 
only a fraction of the relevant externalities. 
The nonprofit entrepreneur’s “warm glow” may, however, lower her de-
mands for a return on her investments or salary for managing the firm. If the 
“warm glow” reduces capital or labor costs for the nonprofit, the nonprofit 
                                                                                                                      
 129. Any manager whose compensation depends on profitability presumably shares this in-
centive, though in practice the compensation structures of nonprofits dampen the connection 
between profits and managerial returns. 
 130. Malani and Posner come to this conclusion, but only after making the alternative argu-
ment described above:  
What if the output being produced is a public good? Then the additional production of quantity 
by the nonprofit altruist may be efficient. One way to state this is that the tax break modifies an 
altruistic entrepreneur’s costs so that they are more in line with the social value of a good. An-
other way to state it is that the price that donors pay for additional quantity plus the warm-glow 
consumption value from the additional quantity do not capture the full public good value of 
that output. Once that public good value is accounted for, the additional quantity would be 
worth the costs.  
Malani & Posner, supra note 12, at 2047. 
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has a cost advantage over a for-profit, not the other way around. The non-
profit enjoys this cost advantage over a for-profit precisely because donors 
and workers at the firm know that output is being maximized, rather than the 
rents being diverted into someone else’s pocket.  
So at this point it may seem that nonprofit charities are better situated 
than for-profits to receive government subsidies. In fact, Malani and Posner 
acknowledge that the nonprofit form may well generate superior outcomes if 
managers of nonprofits produce more output and there are positive external-
ities associated with production.131 But this would only be true if nonprofits 
and for-profits faced the same costs. The article then asserts that nonprofits 
must have higher costs because they don’t have the same incentives to keep 
costs down as for-profit managers. Further, people willing to be managers of 
nonprofits are in limited supply while, presumably, the supply of for-profit 
entrepreneurs is inexhaustible. Unfortunately, the article offers no support 
for either assertion. Indeed, the first assertion conflicts with the article’s as-
sumption that those who opt to work at nonprofit organizations value output.  
Finally, the Malani and Posner argument further assumes that firms are 
price takers. This is another simplifying assumption that distorts the picture 
of how nonprofits operate. In fact, they tend to produce goods in less than 
perfectly competitive markets such as hospital care and education. If one 
makes the reasonable assumption that firms have some market power, they 
face downward-sloping inverse-demand (“ID”) schedules. In such a case, 
the distinction between a profit-maximizing and output-maximizing firm 
would be much greater, since marginal revenue and average revenue would 
not coincide. If we drop the assumption that prices are fixed or that firms 
believe they are, and instead postulate an inverse demand curve ID with 
downward slope, the efficient output is at qf1 in the absence of any external-
ities. A profit maximizer would choose production where marginal revenue 
MR crosses marginal cost MC so that output is inefficiently low, even in the 
absence of externalities. 
An entrepreneur with private marginal benefit PMB of additional output 
still chooses qf2 where PMB crosses MC at point F. If the social marginal 
benefit of additional output exceeds the entrepreneur’s private marginal 
benefit—i.e., there is a positive externality associated with increased out-
put—then this output level is also inefficiently low. 
In this setting, an output-maximizing nonprofit manager still chooses qf3 
in the absence of a subsidy and qnt with a subsidy. These will be inefficient 
except in the special case that the social marginal benefit crosses MC ex-
actly at point H in the absence of a subsidy or point J in the presence of a 
subsidy. If the government or donors have further knowledge about the so-
cial marginal benefit, they can adjust the subsidy amount to achieve any 
desired level of output greater than qf3 in a way that is not possible to ac-
complish with a for-profit firm. 
                                                                                                                      
 131. Id.  
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D. Imperfect Consumers 
Finally, in considering a more realistic case than the one described in 
Section IV.B, Malani and Posner ask whether for-profit charities could be 
justified when prospective donors cannot contract perfectly with charities 
and, therefore, cannot ensure that their donations go to the intended benefi-
ciaries. They conclude that we should not worry about such luckless donors 
since consumer protections that apply to usual commercial enterprises could 
be brought to bear on charities, even for-profit charities. After all, a person 
who is a victim of fraud by an auto dealer or a grocer is no less vulnerable 
than a donor to charities who may find that his money has not in fact saved 
children in Africa.  
It is unlikely that consumer protection laws would help with this prob-
lem, since the information asymmetry is still unresolved ex post. Shortly 
after driving home the used car or cutting open the lemons on the kitchen 
counter the purchaser discovers whether he paid too much or got too little. If 
a donor cannot go to Africa to count mosquito nets in a village, the asymme-
try is never resolved. Contracting for independent audits goes only part way 
toward helping, just as it does in the usual commercial case. Even the best 
imaginable auditor cannot detect whether a given level of charitable output 
was the result of an entrepreneur’s effort, spending choices, enemy action, 
or luck; and, as suggested above, there is simply no way to resolve the in-
formation problem in some circumstances, as in the provision of some types 
of medical care. 
Consumer protection is most effective in settings in which violations can 
be clearly identified, and these are typically cases in which actions rather 
than motives are at stake. In a for-profit setting the profit motive is under-
stood, and the consumer protection issue is whether in the pursuit of profits 
the firm violates the rights of consumers. In the case of for-profit charities 
the mixed motives of the recipient of a donation greatly complicate the task 
of protecting the interests of donors, since an organization’s failure to 
achieve charitable goals or even to undertake the most effective charitable 
actions may reflect either excessive profit motivation or just a usual degree 
of organizational slippage. Since in practice it is extremely difficult to con-
tract ex ante over all of the relevant dimensions of charitable activity, donors 
are left to rely at least in part on charitable motives, the absence of which is 
largely unenforceable ex post. 
V. Taking For-Profit Charities Seriously:  
Unintended Tax Consequences 
Suppose that the U.S. government decided to run with the logic of for-
profit charities and afford them benefits similar to those available to non-
profits today. What would be the features of such a regime? 
Those who would reform this system have in mind that an individual 
who gave $1,000 to General Electric (“GE”) to promote green energy would 
be entitled to deduct the $1,000 from his taxable income. Presumably GE 
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would need to include the $1,000 in its taxable income.132 Assuming that GE 
faithfully devotes the $1,000 to a venture that produces no financial return 
other than that which comes from saving the planet, GE would deduct its 
$1,000 expenditure on green energy as a cost,133 and end with zero tax liabil-
ity and zero net profit. Under the proposed reform, the individual donor 
would be out $1,000 but receive a tax deduction as partial compensation. 
To what extent would such a regime differ from what taxpayers are al-
ready entitled to do? If GE announces a costly initiative to help the 
environment, a taxpayer is certainly entitled to buy shares of GE as a gesture 
of support. (Equivalently, existing GE shareholders might demand that their 
company use more of its expertise to help the environment, despite the 
costs.) If in fact the financial return is low, then the taxpayer will be out per-
haps $1,000 relative to what she might have earned by purchasing shares of 
a company that cares nothing for the environment and everything for profits. 
Of course, the taxpayer does not lose the whole $1,000. As we noted, the 
reduced return brings with it a reduced tax liability, and the taxpayer’s situa-
tion is equivalent to (actually, rather better than) a situation in which she had 
donated $1,000 directly to the company.134 
Suppose, for example, that GE has 1 million shareholders and devotes 
$1 billion of its capital to an environmental project on which it expects to 
earn no return and lose its entire investment. Any shareholder’s pro rata 
share of this environmental investment is $1,000. GE will ultimately write 
off this investment, and claim a $1 billion deduction against its taxable in-
come, thereby reducing its corporate tax liability by the product of $1 
billion and its tax rate (currently 35 percent). Thus, GE loses $1 billion on 
the investment but as partial compensation claims a tax loss worth $350 mil-
lion (35 percent of $1 billion). From the standpoint of an individual GE 
shareholder, the net cost of the environmental project is $650 ($1,000 minus 
the pro rata tax benefit of $350), which is the net cost that an individual in a 
35 percent tax bracket would incur in making a deductible $1,000 charitable 
donation. 
                                                                                                                      
 132. Contributions are not currently taxable as income to recipients, but permitting individual 
tax deductions for contributions to for-profit charities would require an accompanying change in 
which the contributions represented taxable income to the for-profit charities. This taxable income 
would then be offset by subsequent deductions for expenses or contributions by the for-profit chari-
ties. Failure to treat contributions as income while permitting deductions for subsequent charitable 
expenses would create an irresistible arbitrage opportunity in which any taxable corporation could 
reduce its income tax liability by persuading (or paying!) donors to route their charitable contribu-
tions through the corporation. 
 133. This assumes that the cost would qualify as an ordinary and necessary business expense 
under I.R.C. § 162, a condition very likely to be satisfied in practice. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006). 
 134. $1,000 of income that is donated to charity produces the same tax result as no income 
and no deduction only if the taxpayer can take full advantage of the deduction. As previously noted, 
fewer than half of all taxpayers itemize their deductions, and among those who do itemize, personal 
deductions of this sort are limited to no more than half of income and are phased out over a range as 
income rises. If General Electric undertakes long-term environmental investments that depress share 
values due to their low financial returns, then shareholders receive full benefits of tax deductibility 
only if they can take capital loss deductions on their shares at ordinary income tax rates. 
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Still, there are differences between the current practice and allowing for-
profits to access nonprofit tax benefits. One difference relates to specificity: 
as matters currently stand, all of GE’s shareholders benefit (or not) from 
GE’s decision to devote greater resources to green technologies. To the ex-
tent that there are tax benefits associated with the resulting lower financial 
returns, these tax benefits are shared pro rata according to share ownership. 
A system that permits explicit donations to for-profit corporations would 
facilitate targeting the benefits to contributors. Note that, if shareholders are 
in similar tax brackets, aggregate tax benefits are the same either way; 
though in practice, it would be reasonable to expect that targeting creates 
opportunities for certain potential donors who would benefit the most from 
charitable deductions to claim disproportionate shares of these deductions. 
Would the potential reform permit unlimited deductions for contribu-
tions to for-profit entities, or would the deductions be limited to levels of 
charitable or worthwhile activity by the recipient, somehow defined? Pre-
sumably, the value of deductions should be limited to the marginal excess 
social value of worthwhile activity inspired by contributions; but that is too 
much to ask of tax administrators. It does not require very much imagination 
to envision the nightmare that any such restrictions would produce. Running 
with the logic of permitting these deductions, however, it is far from clear 
that any restrictions are needed. Who, after all, would contribute to a for-
profit corporation, unless out of the sense of somehow improving the world? 
Who indeed? One candidate would be someone who expects to benefit 
from making such a contribution—and once again, very little imagination is 
required to envision such cases. A too-obvious example is the case of a fa-
ther who contributes to a company owned entirely by his daughter. In the 
absence of restrictions that would surely apply in such an obvious case, the 
father would take a tax deduction and the daughter’s company would in-
clude the money as taxable income. There are many cases in which the 
company’s tax rate will fall below the father’s tax rate,135 producing what is, 
in essence, a net tax deduction for a transfer from a parent to a child. Re-
stricting the tax benefit to altruistic activity on the part of the recipient 
company does not address the avoidance problem, since it is impossible to 
distinguish altruistic activity that the company would engage in anyway 
from altruistic activity for which the gift is responsible. 
Quite apart from this obvious tax arbitrage, such a treatment is inconsis-
tent with the income tax system’s general treatment of private (i.e., 
noncharitable) gifts,136 in which recipients are not taxed, and givers do not 
receive deductions. There are many nuances to this system, but one of its 
virtues is that it prevents a large number of the obvious and less obvious tax 
arbitrages that accompany any other regime. Any deviation from this system 
                                                                                                                      
 135. Since tax rates for corporations and individuals rise with income, this condition is gener-
ally satisfied if the father has a higher income than the daughter and her company is taxed as a flow-
through entity such as a partnership, LLC, S corporation, or proprietorship. If instead the daughter’s 
company is a C corporation, then the condition is satisfied if the father’s personal tax rate exceeds 
the tax rate applicable to the corporation’s level of income. 
 136. See I.R.C. § 102 (2006). 
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creates the potential for enormous tax arbitrage and associated inefficiency, 
which is why there is so much regulatory and enforcement activity associ-
ated with requiring that nonprofit activity not create excessive benefits for 
certain individuals. The fact that the rest of the tax system distinguishes be-
tween private and charitable gifts increases the likelihood that taxpayers 
would exploit this avenue of making disguised gifts with special tax attrib-
utes. 
In considering the various tax arbitrages, remember that by far, the bulk 
of deductible charitable contributions in the United States goes to religious 
organizations. Imagine a for-profit religious organization seeking donations, 
with some if not all of the organization’s profits retained by the religious 
entrepreneur in charge. Should all of the contributions be deductible? As 
matters stand it is extremely difficult for the government to distinguish be-
tween deductible contributions to religious organizations and fees for 
services,137 and the ability of nonprofit entrepreneurs to retain profits would 
create irresistible incentives to reclassify fees for profitmaking activities as 
deductible contributions. And if not—that is, in the politically unrealistic 
case in which religion is to be taken off the table such that only nonreligious 
organizations were to qualify for the benefits of this new tax regime—the 
new regime would compound the difficulties the IRS already faces in distin-
guishing religious from nonreligious organizations. 
Malani and Posner further propose that firms be entitled to appeal to the 
IRS to permit their donors to receive tax deductions, if necessary paying the 
administrative costs that the IRS would incur in evaluating the appeal and 
enforcing subsequent behavior. How exactly this might work is unclear,138 
and given all of the other issues, the details are likely to matter very much 
for the underlying welfare economics of the outcome. If a for-profit firm 
actually attracts disinterested contributions, and the deductibility of these 
contributions is contingent on the firm’s actions, then the marginal subsidy 
rate for charitable activity depends on the extent to which tax benefits rise 
with greater activity, in addition to the usual subsidy that accompanies not 
earning taxable profits.  
There is a more fundamental point at stake, which is the apparent arbi-
trariness of restricting tax benefits based on entity classifications. Malani 
and Posner forcefully argue that activities, not entity attributes, should gov-
ern the tax treatment of charitable undertakings. While acknowledging that 
the two are perhaps correlated, the article makes the point that an entity 
classification regime is too rigid to correspond to the underlying reality and 
needs of the charitable sector. 
Charitable deductions are hardly the only activity governed by entity 
classifications. In the tax realm, business entities are taxed very differently 
based on whether they are partnerships, S corporations, C corporations, lim-
ited liability companies, foreign branches or foreign subsidiaries, and 
numerous other distinctions. Outside of the tax area, law schools that are 
                                                                                                                      
 137. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
 138. Fleischer, supra note 114. 
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accredited are treated differently than those that are not. Doctors, drivers, 
and alcohol vendors must receive licenses to operate, and individuals who 
are citizens of the world nonetheless must hold citizenship in just one or at 
most a small number of countries. 
Are all of these classifications arbitrary? To take a medical example, 
there might be a hog butcher who has not attended medical school and who 
therefore does not have a license to practice medicine, but who nonetheless 
has superior skills with the knife and has learned how to perform appendec-
tomies. This person could have excellent training in this one very specific 
procedure, keep up with relevant medical research, be aware of all the pos-
sible complications and what to do about them, practice the procedure 
regularly on cadavers, and in every relevant way not only be competent to 
perform appendectomies, but also be better at them than many surgeons cur-
rently removing appendixes. Should the government permit that individual 
to file for a license to practice appendectomies? Should he be permitted to 
do them in his butcher shop? What if he promises to keep the shop as sterile 
as a hospital, maybe even more so because there are not a lot of sick people 
around to spread their germs? 
Most reasonable people would have serious qualms about licensing sin-
gle-procedure doctors or allowing them to perform their trade in a butcher’s 
shop, for reasons that bear on an evaluation of for-profit charities. If some-
one cares so much about appendectomies, why didn’t that person go to 
medical school? Maybe this one butcher is extremely committed to the ex-
cellent, part-time practice of performing appendectomies. But will most 
butcher-surgeons be as committed? Is it reasonable to expect the govern-
ment to be able to evaluate and monitor the practices of every physician so 
certified?  
Becoming a doctor, rather than a butcher, suggests a commitment to the 
practice of medicine. One of the virtues of entity classification is its recur-
sive nature: the government certifies the American Medical Association, the 
American Medical Association certifies a medical school, and the medical 
school certifies its graduates.139 Incentives for reputation, together with de-
centralized decision making, are generally thought to produce better 
outcomes than the alternative form of extreme centralization envisioned in 
vesting all authority in a central government agency that might adjudicate 
appeals for specialty exceptions to general rules.  
In addition, doctors work with each other and not with butchers. They 
share information and the profession develops norms, both formally and 
informally. This is much the same as in the nonprofit sector, a sector that 
largely relies on self-governance rather than external policing.140 It is un-
                                                                                                                      
 139. This system creates the somewhat separate regulatory problem that licensure is a form of 
monopoly, and the AMA and its members may overreach. We thank Gene Steuerle for these obser-
vations. 
 140. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Indep. Sector, Principles for Good Governance and 
Ethical Practice: A Guide for Charities and Foundations (2007). In addition to self-governance, the 
sector worked closely with Congress such that many features regulating the sector in the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 stemmed from sector recommendations. Independent Sector, Public Policy—
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likely that the average appendectomy-performing butcher (just like the aver-
age for-profit executive) will have time to attend the relevant professional 
events communicating the advances in surgery (or advances in nonprofit 
management). It is reasonable also to be concerned that multitasking butch-
ers—or executives—might occasionally confuse their tasks or objectives, to 
the detriment of the object of their actions. 
Putting aside these theoretical problems, how, exactly, would the IRS or 
an agency it designates actually go about determining the scope of permissi-
ble for-profit charitable activity to which new tax benefits would be 
attached? Quite apart from the obvious potential for undue political or bu-
reaucratic influences over these determinations, there is the difficulty of 
processing the needed information and monitoring compliance, as a result of 
which there is likely to be considerable scope for tax avoidance from tax 
exemptions that do not conform exactly to underlying activities. Again, 
these administrative costs would need to be weighed against the advantages 
in terms of the additional efficiencies generated from expanding the universe 
of parties who can participate in the market for such tax subsidies (beyond 
non profit organizations). But for reasons discussed above, it seems ex-
tremely unlikely that the advantages would outweigh the costs. 
Even if the charitable activities of for-profit companies could be  
accurately assessed and costlessly enforced, there remains the issue of how 
for-profit and nonprofit entities might affect each other in the markets for 
contributions and service provision. Greater charitable activity by for-profits 
need not displace activities by nonprofits, though that is a plausible out-
come. From a policy standpoint, is it better to have charitable decisions 
made by a for-profit entity with twin goals of making profits and advancing 
charitable ends, or by an organization without shareholders to reward? If 
donors were altruistically motivated and had complete information and the 
ability to contract fully with donees, then this would be a question for do-
nors to consider; but in the absence of pure motives, full information, and 
contracting rights, it also becomes a matter of public policy. The actions of 
for-profit charities could be designed to enhance company profits indirectly, 
with private donors who either do not know that their contributions are not 
wisely used or do not care as much as they should, instead reacting to  
appealing marketing campaigns. Either way, any evaluation of the normative 
implications of attracting donations in such settings must address the possi-
bility of such a system to reduce contributions to organizations in which the 
resources would do more good.  
One of the asserted virtues of authorizing for-profit charities is the na-
ture of profit-sharing arrangements that give for-profit managers incentives 
to minimize administrative costs. So the argument goes, nonprofit managers 
do not benefit from the same incentives, either because their objectives are 
                                                                                                                      
Accountability and Oversight, http://www.independentsector.org/programs/gr/charityreform.html 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
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more diffuse or their costs are not easily identified,141 though this argument 
presumes the use of suboptimal compensation schemes and inadequacy of 
competition in the nonprofit sector. Certainly for-profit ventures have incen-
tives to minimize cost at any given level of output, but that is not all, since 
they also have incentives to adjust output in ways that are sensitive to costs. 
Since charitable output is notoriously difficult to measure, a for-profit man-
ager who shares in corporate profits may have an incentive to disguise 
output to earn extra compensation. She would also—again, if true charitable 
output is not completely verifiable—have incentives to reduce administra-
tive costs to an inefficiently low level.  
Significant costs would be associated with reforming the treatment of 
for-profit firms that engage in charitable activity. Greater incentives for 
charitable activity come at the price of creating new tax clienteles, increased 
regulatory complexity and enforcement costs, and the creation of new op-
portunities for tax arbitrage. Pursuing such changes, then, should require 
forceful justification and explanation of why the current regime is inefficient 
or untenable. We do not find persuasive the claims in the recent article by 
Malani and Posner that the current regime is broken.  
Conclusions  
A customer entering an ice cream parlor does not throw money across 
the counter and hope that the creamery will produce a mocha-almond-fudge 
cone of just the right size. Nor does anyone enter a store with a “shoemaker” 
sign, slip a check into the till, and wait for just the right shoes. Those who 
want ice cream place very specific orders; similarly, people buy shoes based 
on style, color, and size—and only after trying them on.  
Why shouldn’t the government behave this way when it buys charitable 
goods? Decide it wants something specific—buy it, evaluate it, and repeat. 
Rather, the government throws tax exemptions at something akin to a char-
ity store and hopes it gets what it needs. Many observers find this approach 
puzzling, and—at least on the surface—it is.  
The idea of providing tax subsidies to for-profit charities has the same 
sort of intuitive appeal. If they perform the same public functions as non-
profits, why wouldn’t the government give them the same incentives? 
Wouldn’t doing so expand the scope of possible providers, encourage com-
petition, and enlarge the range of positive contributors to society? 
Furthermore, since for-profit firms do not labor under the same restrictions 
to which nonprofits are subject—in particular, the requirement that nonprof-
its not distribute profits to managers or other stakeholders—for-profits 
appear to be able to tailor their activities in ways that promote greater pro-
ductivity and efficiency than many nonprofits. 
                                                                                                                      
 141. Similar concerns arise in the comparison of public versus private production. See, e.g., 
Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. 
Econ. 1127 (1997) (discussing why public production is sometimes preferred); Caves & Christen-
sen, supra note 107, at 960. 
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Further examination suggests that the government may show uncommon 
wisdom in subsidizing nonprofit firms to provide goods with positive exter-
nalities just because those firms are nonprofit. At a minimum, the reasons 
advanced for not adhering to this 400-year-old tradition are not compelling. 
Nonprofits have plenty of tools at their disposal, such as incentive compen-
sation, to generate the behavior that government wants. The law is on their 
side.  
Moreover, the reasons that have been advanced in favor of rejecting sta-
tus-based subsidies are founded on economic analysis that is too limited. 
The argument considers only a partial equilibrium setting with a single 
price-taking firm, failing to account for the nature of competition and ra-
tional behavior by nonprofit managers or to note that the usual benefits of 
for-profit competition arise from the competition, not the profits. The re-
strictions that prevent nonprofit organizations from distributing profits do 
not force them into inefficient investment patterns or subpar management 
practices, since with multiple potential uses for their funds and many alter-
native possible management practices, they confront no shortage of avenues 
for social value creation. Efficient resource allocation requires proper moti-
vation, and here the prevailing high level of competition from other 
nonprofit competitors not only encourages and rewards efficient behavior, 
but also diminishes the survival prospects of inefficient organizations, the-
reby serving the same cleansing function of for-profit markets. 
Perhaps most importantly, the proposed alternative—giving a tax break 
to for-profit charities—would create new avenues for tax avoidance. Permit-
ting tax deductions for donations to for-profit entities permits a form of 
arbitrage in which donors with high marginal tax rates can claim deductions 
for what are actually gifts to owners of recipient organizations. Policymak-
ers committed to equal tax treatment of the charitable activities of nonprofit 
and for-profit organizations might well respond to the resulting tax base ero-
sion by scaling back on the deductibility of contributions to both, with 
predictable consequences for contribution levels and the volume of charita-
ble activity.  
The costs of extending tax privileges to for-profits that provide charity 
appear not only in the tax system but also in the efficiency of resource allo-
cation. The costs include the proposal’s effects on for-profit charities and 
their contributors, as well as effects on the nonprofit sector. Since for-profit 
entities already receive an implicit tax subsidy for their altruistic actions, the 
greater opportunities available from adding explicit tax benefits would cre-
ate tax arbitrage opportunities and distort the behavior of those who seek 
them, necessitating the devotion of enormous resources to oversight and 
control. Subsidized charitable activity by for-profit firms inevitably affects 
nonprofit organizations and the activities that they undertake and support. 
Given the degree of competition in the nonprofit sector, greater entry by for-
profits cannot be expected to enhance the degree of competition meaning-
fully, instead changing its nature to something less consistent with what is 
envisioned by granting public support to charity and its providers. Properly 
encouraging and rewarding charitable activity does not entail making  
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explicit tax benefits available to everyone, but instead involves identifying 
cases in which recipients of donated funds pursue clearly identified charita-
ble ends without the potential for conflict of interest that inevitably 
accompanies the profit motive.  
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